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ATTACHMENT IN NEW MEXICO-Part I.
VERN COUNTRYMANN

Attachment, the provisional writ under which property of a defendant is
brought into judicial custody before or during litigation and held for application against any money judgment plaintiff may recover, is said to have originated
in England in the custom of London.' As transferred to this country, however,
it is entirely a creature of state statutes 2 which the federal courts follow, formerly under the Conformity Act,' and now as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 64. 4 These statutes may authorize garnishment of those indebted to or holding property of the defendant under the attachment writ, or
may provide, as those of New Mexico now do, 5 for a separate writ of
garnishment.
A study of New Mexico attachment law is, therefore, a study of the interpretation of statutes governing the use of that writ in the district courts6 and
before the justices of the peace. 7 I have been aided in this study by the advice
of a number of lawyers 8 and by the response to a questionnaire by eleven dis9
trict court clerks.
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
1. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) ; Drake on Attachment, ch. 1 (7th ed.
1891).
2. Save for special federal provisions for attachment in postal suits. 28 U.S.C. §§27102718 (Supp. II, 1960).
3. Ch. 255, §6, 17 Stat. 197 (1872). See also the earlier Process Acts, ch. 21, 1 Stat.
93 (1789), ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275 (1792).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(64) (1953) takes from the corresponding federal rule
so much of its language as provides, redundantly for state practice: "At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies providing for seizure of person
or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be
entered in the action are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided
by the law of the state."
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§26-2-1 through 26-2-36 (1953).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§26-1-1 through 26-1-44 (1953).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§36-7-1 through 36-7-11 (1953).
8. W. E. Bondurant, Jr., Paul L. Butt, Henry A. Kiker, Jr., William C. Schaab,
Thomas J. Smiley, and Charles M. Tansey, Jr., of the New Mexico bar, Robert D.
Sandifer of the Missouri bar, Professor Joseph R. Burcham of St. Louis University
School of Law, Professor Glenn Avann McCleary of the University of Missouri and
Professor John M. Speca of the University of Kansas City School of Law.
9. Responses were received from the clerks of the following counties: Dona Ana and
Lincoln (Third District), San Miguel (Fourth District), Eddy and Chaves (Fifth District), Luna (Sixth District), Union (Eighth District), Curry (Ninth District), Quay
(Tenth District) and McKinley (Eleventh District). A response for the Bernalillo
County Clerk (Second District) was filed by an Assistant District Attorney.
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THE MISSOURI HERITAGE

On September 22, 1846, exactly forty-three days after his United States
forces had concluded a march from Fort Leavenworth against evaporating
Mexican troops and had occupied Santa Fe "without firing a gun or spilling
a single drop of blood,"' 1 General Kearny promulgated his Code of Laws for
the Government of the Territory of New Mexico." In his letter of transmittal
to the Adjutant General,' 2 Kearny reported that this considerable feat was
due entirely to the efforts of Colonel A. W. Doniphan and Private Willard
P. Hall of the First Regiment of Missouri Volunteers and that they had
taken their Code provisions from the laws of Mexico, Missouri, Texas and
the Livingston Code. So far as the attachment provisions of the Kearny Code
are concerned,' 3 the two Missouri soldier-lawyers did not stray from the 1845
edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri which one of them must have carried in his saddlebags. They selected and slightly revised twenty-one of the
sixty-four Missouri sections dealing with attachment proceedings in the circuit courts, 14 and added a section making the same procedure applicable before

justices of the peace. 15 Like the Missouri law, the Kearny Code provided for
summoning garnishees under the attachment writ.
Subsequent amendments, many of them not traceable to Missouri, more than
doubled the length of the New Mexico attachment laws and in 1876 the territorial legislature adopted the Missouri plan, but wrote its own implementing
provisions, of a separate attachment law for justice of the peace courts.' 6
In 1907 the New Mexico attachment laws were completely rewritten as a
part of the revision of the Code of Civil Procedure.' 7 In this revision the attachment law of the 1899 Revised Statutes of Missouri obviously served as
a model,' 8 although the revisors were not hesitant to undertake improvements.
10. Proclamation to the Inhabitants of New Mexico, by Brig. Gen. S. W. Kearny,
August 22, 1846, reprinted in Hughes, Doniphan's Expedition, S. Doc. No. 608, 63rd Cong,.
2d Sess. 47 (1914), and in 2 Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History, 211,

n. 148 (1912).
11. Save as the Kearny Code exceeded the General's authority in one respect by
attempting to provide for election of a delegate to Congress, it was recognized as valid
law of the Territory. Ward v. Broadwell, 1 N.M. 75 (1854).
12. Reprinted in 2 Twitchell, supra note 10 at 214, n. 153, and in Kearny Code
(1846), at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 299 (1953).
13. The attachment provisions of the Kearny Code appear in 1 N.M. Stat. Ann.

303-07 (1953).
14. Mo. Rev. Stat., ch. 11, art. I (1845).
15. The Missouri law contained separate provisions for attachment in justice of the
peace courts. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art II(1845).
16. N.M. Laws 1876, ch. 27, §§56-79; (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §§36-7-1 through 36-7-11

(1953)).
17. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107.
18. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 3 (1899). The Missouri attachment is now codified in Mo.
Ann. Stat. §§521.010 through 521.890 (1953) and is largely duplicated and to some
extent revised by Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 85, effective April 1, 1960.
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No change was then made in the separate provisions for attachment in actions
before justices of the peace or in the practice of summoning garnishees under
the attachment writ, but in 1909 separate provisions were enacted to govern
garnishment in both the district and justice of the peace courts. 9
Because much of our attachment law is derived from Missouri, 20 the decisions of the Missouri courts interpreting similar or identical language are entitled to more than ordinary consideration. Our court has indicated that it will
follow the decisions in the originating state construing a statute before its adoption in New Mexico unless there is good reason for not doing so, in accord with
the common notion that there is a "presumption" that this is what the legislature intended when it adopted the statute. 21 There appears to be little difference in the court's attitude toward decisions of the originating state handed
down after adoption in New Mexico. 22 While there is language indicating
that decisions of intermediate appellate courts of the originating state are en19. N.M. Laws 1909, ch. 63 (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §§26-2-1 through 26-2-36 (1953)).
20. The New Mexico Supreme Court has often noted this fact. Torlina v. Trorlicht,
5 N.M. 148, 154, 21 Pac. 69, 77 (1889), on rehearing, 6 N.M. 54, 27 Pac. 794 (1891)
Territory ex rel. Leyser v. Rindskopf & Co., 5 N.M. 93, 98, 20 Pac. 180, 181 (1899)
Perea v. Colorado National Bank, 6 N.M. 1, 3-4, 27 Pac. 322, 324-25 (1891) ; Ripley v.
Astec Mining Co., 6 N.M. 415, 417, 29 Pac. 773, 774 (1892) ; Baca v. Coury, 27 N.M. 611,
613, 204 Pac. 57, 58 (1922) ; Marron v. Barton, 34 N.M. 516, 517, 285 Pac. 502 (1930).
See also Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 185 (1857).
21. Armijo v. Armijo, 4 N.M. 57, 65, 13 Pac. 92, 95 (1887) ; Territory ex rel. Leyser
v. Rindskopf & Co., supra note 20; Perea v. Colorado National Bank, supra note 20;
Bullard v. Lopez, 7 N.M. 561, 566, 37 Pac. 1103, 1104 (1894) ; Reymond v. Newcomb,
10 N.M. 121, 173, 61 Pac. 205, 206 (1900) ; Bremen Mining Co. v. Bremen, 13 N.M. 111,
122, 79 Pac. 806, 811 (1905) ; Sacramento Irrigation Co. v. Lee, 15 N.M. 567, 579, 113
Pac. 834, 837 (1910) ; Dow v. Simpson, 17 N.M. 357, 365, 132 Pac. 568, 570 (1912);
Palmer v. Town of Farmington, 25 N.M. 145, 153, 179 Pac. 227, 230 (1919) ; State v.
Taylor, 33 N.M. 35, 37, 261 Pac. 808, 809 (1927) ; State v. Bank of Magdalena, 33 N.M.
473, 477, 270 Pac. 881, 883 (1928) ; State v. Chavez, 42 N.M. 569, 574, 82 P.2d 900, 903
(1938) ; White v. Montoya, 46 N.M. 241, 244, 126 P.2d 471, 473, (1942) ; Smith v.
Meadows, 56 N.M. 242, 250, 242 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1952) ; Featherstone v. Bureau of
Revenue, 58 N.M. 557, 561, 273 P.2d 752, 755 (1954). This "presumption" is overcome
if the New Mexico court concludes that such construction is "not in accord with sound
reasoning,

common

sense . . . or . . . would

render

the statute

inconsistent

with

other laws intended to be retained, or the public policy of" New Mexico. McDonald v.
Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 32, 85 P.2d 78, 81 (1938) ; Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 32,
155 P.2d 1010, 1017 (1944) ; State v. Reed, 39 N.M. 44, 51, 39 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1935) ;
Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 492, 185 Pac. 780, 790 (1919) ; Ripley v. Astec Mining Co.,
supra note 20.
22. Such decisions are "not binding," since they present "no question of adopted
construction." Ickes v. Brimhall, 42 N.M. 412, 416, 79 P.2d 942, 944 (1938) ; State v.
State Bank, 38 N.M. 338, 342, 32 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1934). But they are "entitled to respectful consideration," Cain v. Bowlby 114 F.2d 519, 523 (10 cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
710 (1940), and may be found "highly persuasive." Ickes v. Brimhall, supra. See also
Carney v. McGinnis, 358 P.2d 694 (N.M. 1961) ; Lopez v. Singh, 53 N.M. 245, 247, 205
P.2d 492, 493 (1949).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. I

2

titled to less weight than those of its highest court, 3 there is evidence that
24
decisions of the intermediate courts are also persuasive.
II. THE VALUES AND RiSKS OF ATTACHMENT
Although these matters are discussed in detail later, any examination of the
attachment law should proceed with full awareness of the value of the device
and of the risks inherent in its use. One constant value to plaintiff in all attachment cases is the acquisition of a lien on defendant's property from the time of
levy. 25 Another value, in any instance where personal jurisdiction over defendant cannot be obtained, is the "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction obtained by attachment and substituted service. 26 On the other hand, the risks of the attachment
plaintiff are substantial. In addition to the possibility of liability to third
parties for erroneous levy upon their property, 27 there is also the danger of
liability to the attachment defendant on and apart from the attachment bond
if either the attachment or the underlying cause is dismissed. 28 There is also
the danger that the attachment action will precipitate a bankruptcy proceeding
in which plaintiff will lose all advantage gained by his attachment. 29
III. AVAILABILITY OF ATTACHMENT

A. Nature of Claim:The Kearny Code followed the Missouri language of the
time and authorized "creditors" to "sue their debtors . . . by attachment." 30
Shortly after adoption here, the Missouri Supreme Court read this language
to mean that attachment was not available in a tort suit. 3' The Missouri statute
was then changed to authorize attachment in "any civil action." 32 We retain
23. State v. State Bank, supra note 22, declining to follow an 1835 New Jersey Court
of Chancery decision interpreting the corporation statute adopted here in 1905.
24. Other pre-adoption interpretations of the New Jersey corporation law by the New
Jersey Chancellor have been followed here. Sacramento Irrigation Co. v. Lee, 15 N.M.
567, 13 Pac. 834 (1910) ; State v. Bank of Magdalena, 33 N.M. 473, 270 Pac. 881 (1923),
And in two instances our court has elected to follow decisions of the Missouri Courts
of Appeals interpreting the attachment statute long after its adoption here. Baca v.
Coury, 27 N.M. 611, 204 Pac. 57 (1922) ; Marron v. Barton, 34 N.M. 516, 285 Pac. 502
(1930). See also Jones v. Page, 26 N.M. 440, 447, 194 Pac. 883, 886 (1920), following a 1916 decision of the New Jersey Chancellor interpreting the corporation statute
adopted in New Mexico in 1905.
25. See The Attachment Lien, part II. (to appear Vol. II, No. 1).
26. See Aquiring Jurisdiction Through Attachment, ibid.
27. See Third Party Claims, ibid.
28. See The Risks of Attachment-Financial Liability, ibid.
29. See The Risks of Attachment-Bankruptcy, ibid.
30. Kearny Code, Attachments §§1, 22 (1846) at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303, 314 (1953)
Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §1 (1845).
31. McDonald v. Forsyth, 13 Mo. 549 (1850).
32. Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010 (1953). See Pearson v. Gillett, 55 Mo. App. 312 (1893)
Houston v. Woolley, 37 Mo. App. 15 (1889). Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 12, art. I, §1 (1855).
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the original language,33 but in 1882 added a separate section3 4 authorizing
attachment in tort actions as well as in contract actions, in both the district and
the justice of the peace courts. 35
By adopting this course we may have avoided a problem which has arisen
in Missouri. There, the phrase "any civil action" is construed to refer only
to such actions as were formerly actions at law, so that attachment is not available in actions formerly equitable.36 Our statute, speaking of actions "founded
upon contract . . . tort or other action ex delicto," 7 focuses upon the nature
of the underlying claim and need not be construed to make the availability of
38
attachment depend upon the form of the action or the remedy sought.
At the time of the promulgation of the Kearny Code, the Missouri attachment law made no provision for attachment prior to the time when plaintiff's
underlying claim had matured so that suit could be brought upon it. One year
later Missouri gave creditors some protection against their debtors' anticipatory
moves by authorizing attachment on "a demand not yet due." 39 New Mexico
did not deal with the matter until more than a quarter of a century later, when
it authorized attachment "on a demand not yet due in any case where an attachment is authorized, in the same manner as upon demands already due."' 40 In
Missouri, this authorization is not construed to extend to contingent claims
but only to "an actual subsisting debt, which will become due by the efflux
of time," so that persons secondarily liable on the debtor's undertakings cannot
bring attachment suits against the debtor on his obligation to indemnify until
they have first paid his debt. The rule was established in a case where the principal debt had matured so that it was perhaps not unfair to the surety to require
him before attaching to make payment which he would have to make before he
could take judgment. 41 But it has been applied as a matter of course to the
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§26-1-1, 36-7-1 (1953).
34. N.M. Laws 1882, ch. 5, §1, at 21; N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107 §1 (183) ; N.M. Stat.
Ann. §26-1-2 (1953).
35. Butler Paper Co. v. Sydney, 47 N.M. 463, 144 P.2d 170 (1943). For the distinction between an action on a statute imposing a penalty, for which attachment is not
available, and an action to enforce a statutory remedy for a private wrong, for which
attachment is available, see Denison v. Tocker, 55 N.M. 184, 229 P.2d 285 (1951).
36. State ex rel. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath, Inc. v. Harris, 349 Mo. 190, 159
S.W.2d 799 (1942), and cases cited; Hisel v. Chrysler Corp., 90 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Mo.
1950).

37. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-2 (1953).
38. But it may take a generous interpretation of "contract" and "tort" to encompass
the separate maintenance action where attachment was allowed in State ex rel. Nelson

v. Williams, 249 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. App. 1952). And see Glasgow v. Peyton, 22 N.M. 97,
159 Pac. 670 (1916), mooting the question whether the state may attach in an action for
taxes.

39. Mo. Laws 1847, at 9; Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.020 (1953). In Missouri the grounds
for attachment are more limited where the claim is unmatured than when it is matured.
40. N.M. Laws, 1874 ch. 17, §1, at 38; N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (1953).
41. Hearne & Nichols v. Keath, 63 Mo. 84, 89 (1876). See also Borum v. Reed, 73
Mo. 461 (1881).
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case where the principal debt is not yet due, 4 2 where the justification for depriving the surety of the protection given to other creditors is not apparent.
B. Grounds: Save for the New England states, where indebtedness is treated
as akin to ungodliness, the attachment writ is available only to the plaintiff
who can establish some ground specified in the statute. 43 New Mexico follows
Missouri in the prevailing pattern and specifies most of the same grounds, although New Mexico adaptors took some liberties with the Missouri format.
They also took their own and preserved some Missouri liberties with the King's
44
English. As specified in our statute, the grounds for attachment are nine,
although several of the statutory categories include more than one ground:
First Ground: "When the debtor is not a resident of, nor resides in this
state. ..

"

The Kearny Code took the language from Missouri, 45 although the italicized
phrase was later dropped by Missouri. 46 Use of the disjunctive suggests that
plaintiff must show (a) that defendant does not have a residence here and
(b) that he does not reside here. This in turn suggests that the "residence"
contemplated by the first alternative is something more permanent than the
mere residing contemplated by the second alternative. Two New Mexico cases
support this interpretation. In the first, defendant husband and wife were living in a rented apartment in Texas at the time of attachment, the husband
having left New Mexico more than a year before the attachment and the wife
having sold their home and followed him shortly before the attachment. A
finding that defendants were not "residents" of New Mexico was sustained
and it was pointed out that the statute does not require that defendant "should
be a resident elsewhere." It was enough that defendants "were not residing or
living in the state. They had no home within the state where process could be
served on either of them. ' 47 The second case 48 presents no facts but by its approval of the rejection of proposed instructions establishes that (a) plaintiff
is not entitled to attach merely on a showing that defendant "was not actually
residing in and living at some place of abode in the state," since defendant
42. Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S.W. 198 (1891).
43. See Sturges & Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies,
42 Yale L.J. 487, 503-07 (1933). Some of the New England states ease the plaintiff's
path even further by authorizing all members of the bar to issue their own attachment
writs. See Comment, 38 Yale L.J. 376 (1929).
44. In the 1876 law setting up separate provisions for attachment in justice courts,
the grounds were more limited. N.M. Laws 1876, ch. 27, §56, at 85, but in 1929 the statute
defining grounds for attachment in district courts was made applicable to justice courts.
N.M. Laws 1929, ch. 127, §1, at 238. The 1929 enactment is compiled in N.M. Stat. Ann.
(1953) as §26-1-1 and again as §36-7-1.
45. Kearny Code, Attachments §1(1) (1846), at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303 (1953) (now
N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (I) (1953)) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §1 (1) (1845). (Emphasis added.)
46. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 12, art. I, §1(1) (1856). Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010(1) (1953).
47. First Nat'l Bank v. Payton, 25 N.M. 264, 266, 180 Pac. 979, 980 (1919).
48. First Nat'l Bank v. George, 26 N.M. 176, 179, 190 Pac. 1026, 1027 (1920).
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might be only temporarily absent from his place of abode, and (b) the test of
residence is not whether a subpoena could be served on defendant, since subpoenas must be served personally 49 whereas summons may be served under
what is now Rule 4 (e) (1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure by leaving a copy
with "some person residing at the usual place of abode of the defendant, over
fifteen (15) years of age." 50
By equating the "residence" of the first alternative to the "usual place of
abode" in Rule 4(e) ( 1 ), these cases seem to read "residence" as "domicile," 5 1
leaving for the meaning of the second alternative, "resides," a concept of residence short of domicile-both of which plaintiff must negate to become entitled
52
to attach.
Certain qualifications should be noted for each alternative. Plaintiff should
fail on this first ground for attachment if defendant has a usual abode in the
53
state even though it is not occupied by anyone upon whom process can be served
-although the latter fact in conjunction with others may give plaintiff a case
under the second ground for attachment.5 4 The test under the first alternative
is still "residence," not amenability to service of process. By the same token,
plaintiff should fail on this ground if defendant resides here, even though his
domicile is elsewhere, and even though he is temporarily absent so that he
cannot be served. 55 Conversely, defendant should not be able to defeat attachment on the first ground merely by showing that he was physically present in
the state and therefore could have been served with summons. If he has no
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(45) (c) (1953).
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-(4) (e) (1) (1953). The court relied upon the identical
language of N.M. Code §4532 (1915). The same rule applies to service of process of
justices of the peace. N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-4-4 (1953). Both Rule 4(e) (1) and §36-4-4
provide that if no person be found at defendant's abode willing to accept a copy of
process, service shall be made by posting "in the most public part of defendant's
premises." These provisions may be construed to apply both where there is a person
residing at defendant's abode who is not willing to accept service and where the abode
is unoccupied. But the posted notice which might be sufficient to give in personam jurisdiction in the first instance very probably would not be sufficient for that purpose in the
second. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ;Clovis
Nat'l Bank v. Callaway, 364 P.2d 748 (N.M. 1961); Janes v. West Puerta de Luna
Community Ditch, 23 N.M., 495, 169 Pac. 309 (1917)
Lacy v. Lemmons, 22 N.M. 54,
159 Pac. 949 (1916).
51. This is the Missouri interpretation in cases decided after adoption here and
after Missouri had dropped the disjunctive requirement. Greene v. Beckwith, 38 Mo.
384 (1866) ; Chariton County v. Moberly, 59 Mo. 238 (1875) ; Englehart-Davidson
Mercantile Co. v. Burrell Sisters, 66 Mo. App. 117 (1896). This also seems to be the
meaning given to "usual place of abode" in statutes relating to service of process. See
Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1267 (1940).
52. This seems clear from the statutory language and was the rule in Missouri when
the Missouri Statute included the disjunctive requirement and before it was adopted here.
Lane v. Fellows, 1 Mo. 353 (1823) ; Alexander v. Haden, 2 Mo. 228 (1830).
53. Lane v. Fellows, supra note 52; Chariton County v. Moberly, 59 Mo. 238 (1875).
54. See pp. 310-18, infra.
55. Lane v. Fellows, 1 Mo. 353 (1823).
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domicile here under the first alternative, he must "reside" here under the second, and "reside" connotes living here, however temporarily, rather than merely
being here long enough for service of process.5 6
One further limitation established in Missouri is probably pertinent here.
Since separate provision is made for the out-of-state corporation, 7 the first
ground for attachment is not applicable to corporations."
Second Ground: "When the debtor has concealed himself, or absconded, or
absented himself from his usual place of abode in this state, so that the ordinary
process of law'cannot be passed upon him."
The draftsmen of the Kearny Code here combined two separate grounds for
attachment under the Missouri law-one for concealment and one for absconding or absenting-without significant change of language.5 9
Our court has decided no more under this provision than that, where the
issue is whether defendant has absented himself from his abode so that he cannot
be served, plaintiff is not entitled to submit to the jury the question whether the
defendant's absence "was protracted for an unreasonable time"-"the real
ground for the attachment is, not the length of time the defendant is absent
from the state, but whether he has concealed himself, absconded or absented
himself from his usual place of abode so that the process of law could not be
passed upon him." 60
The Missouri courts have grappled more frequently with the meaning of
the statutory language, but their conclusions are not entirely clear. First, the
supreme court affirmed the dismissal of an attachment where plaintiff had
alleged that defendant had absconded or absented herself so that ordinary process
could not be served upon her, but the record showed that "the writ was served
upon the defendant, within the county, the day after it was issued, and the evidence was satisfactory that she had not been out of it."' Plaintiff contended
that he was entitled to submit to the jury the question whether defendant intended to avoid service of process. But the court, finding defendant's intent an
56. The Missouri Court has entertained the proposition, although plaintiff failed in
his proof, that a defendant who represents himself as a non-resident may be estopped
to deny non-residence in the attachment proceeding. Exchange Bank v. Cooper, 40 Mo.
169 (1867). Defendant has been found estopped as to other grounds, McNichols v. Wise,
62 Mo. App. 443 (1895), but his representation must take the form of an "unequivocal
declaration of facts, which, if true, would have authorized the attachment" and plaintiff must have "sued out the writ under the belief that the statements so made were true."
Staed v. Mahon, 70 Mo. App. 400, 405-06 (1897). See also Rheinhart v. Grant, 24 Mo.
App. 154 (1887).
57. See p. 331, infra.
58. Farnsworth v. Terre-Haute, Alton & St. Louis R.R. Co., 29 Mo. 75 (1859).
59. Kearny Code, Attachments §1(2) (1846), at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303 (1953) (now
N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (II) (1953)) ; Mo.'Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art I, §1(2) (3) (1845)
Mo. Ann Stat. §521.010(2) (3) (1953).
60. First Nat'l Bank v. George, 26 N.M. 176, 180, 190 Pac. 1026, 1027 (1920).
61. Temple v. Cochran, 13 Mo. 116, 118 (1850).
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express element of other grounds for attachment, 62 whereas this ground made
no mention of intent, concluded that defendant's intent to avoid service was
not an issue for the jury.
This decision was followed shortly by another which cast some doubt upon
the first. The second case concerned only the question whether defendant had
absented himself from his abode so that process could not be served upon him.
But in disposing of that question, the court distinguished instances of concealment and absconding as being based upon, "misconduct" of the debtor-a term
which seems to imply a wrongful purpose or intent, as does the court's definition of absconding as a "secret withdrawing."06 3
What the case suggests, later decisions seem to confirm. Evidence that a
debtor secretly left the state and that his wife abandoned their abode in the
state was found by the supreme court to support an affidavit alleging absconding and absence from abode, and evidence that the debtor sold his goods secretly
and at sacrifice prices before leaving was held admissible as tending to show
"that he intended to abscond or absent himself so as to avoid the service
upon
him of the ordinary process of law." 6 4 And a court of appeals has found
evidence for the jury showing a "concealment of defendant's person to avoid
the service of ordinary process" although there was no evidence of absconding
or being absent from defendant's abode, and although the concealment was so
ineffective the writ of attachment was served on defendant on the day of
65
issuance.
Meanwhile, it has been established in Missouri that every debtor who temporarily absents himself from his place of abode without leaving someone in
residence upon whom process can be served does not thereby subject himself
to attachment. There can be no attachment on this ground if "the absence is
such, that if a summons issued upon the day the attachment is sued out, [it]
will be served upon the defendant in sufficient time before the return day to
give the plaintiff all the rights he can have at the return term." 6 6
Such a test raises a question as to when the ground for attachment must exist.
Where defendant challenges the grounds alleged in plaintiff's affidavit, the court
is to try the issue of the truth of the affidavit.6 7 Normally, this will be determined
62. Two other grounds in Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. §§521.010(5), (6) (1953) ; one
other ground in New Mexico N.M. Star. Ann. §26-1-1 (V) (1953).
63. Kingsland v. Worsham, 15 Mo.657, 661 (1852).
64. Ross v. Clark, 32 Mo. 296, 305 (1862).
65. Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v. Graham, 48 Mo. App. 638, 641 (1892).
66. Kingsland v. Worsham, 15 Mo. 657 (1852); Ellington v. Moore, 17 Mo. 424
(1853) ; Chariton County v. Moberly, 59 Mo. 238 (1875). A fortiori, there can be no
attachment on this ground where defendant leaves a resident at his abode upon whom
service can be made. Tiller v. Abernathy, 37 Mo. 196 (1866) ;Independent Breweries Co.
v. Lavin, 207 S.W. 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919) ; Rosenthal v. Windersohler, 115 Mo. App.
237, 91 S.W. 432 (1905).
67. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-31 (1953) ("truth of the affidavit") ; Mo. Ann. Stat.
§521.410 (Supp. 1960) ("truth of the facts alleged in the affidavit").
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as of the date of the affidavit."" But, where defendant complains that the affidavit was made a substantial period of time before the writ of attachment was
issued, he has been told by the Missouri court, before and since our adoption
of Missouri language, that he is entitled to "put in issue the truth of the affidavit at the time of the issuing of the writ." 69 Consistent with the rule that the
70
truth of the affidavit is tested "at the time the writ was actually issued,"
defendant does not defeat attachment on grounds of concealment, absconding
or absence from abode merely by showing that the writ was served upon him
shortly after it was issued."' But evidence of such service is admitted as bearing
on the jury issue, as one court of appeals defined it, whether defendant "intended to . .. return . ..within such a short time that the service of the
' 72
ordinary process of law might be had upon him."
The Missouri experience at least suggests a workable interpretation of the
statutory language. Where the statute refers to absence, concealment or absconding "so that" defendant cannot be served, the quoted language may refer
only to the effect and not to the intent. But "conceal" and "abscond" connote
purposeful action, evasive action. A debtor who conceals himself or absconds
is concealing or absconding from something. In the statutory context here, that
something is "the ordinary process of law." Hence, the debtor's intent to avoid
service of process should be recognized as an element of concealment or absconding under the statute. 73 As so defined, concealment or absconding would also
cover the case of the debtor who absents himself from his usual place of abode
for the purpose of avoiding legal process. But the statutory language authorizing attachment against a debtor who has "absented himself from his usual place
of abode in this state so that the ordinary process of law cannot be passed upon
him" probably should not be read to require an intent to avoid legal process.
So read, it would be superfluous as covering no more than it already covered
68. See First Nat'l Bank v. George, 26 N.M. 176, 178-79, 190 Pac. 1026, 1026-27
(1920).
69. Graham v. Bradbury, 7 Mo. 281, 283 (1841) ; Dider v. Courtney, 7 Mo. 500
(1842) ;Avery v. Good, 114 Mo. 290, 296-97, 21 S.W. 815, 816 (1892) ; Elrod v. Carroll,
202 S.W. 4, 6 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1918).
70. Rosenthal v. Windensohler, 115 Mo. App. 237, 91 S.W. 432 (1905). See also
Taylor v. Myers, 34 Mo. 81 (1863) ; Scudder v. Payton, 65 Mo. App. 314 (1896);
Rainwater v. Faconeoswich, 29 Mo. App. 26 (1888) ; Best & Russell Co. v. Meyerfeld,
77 Mo. App. 181 (1898) ; Conran v. Fenn, 159 Mo. App. 664, 140 S.W. 82 (1911).
Cf. Hamblin v. Dunn, 53 Mo. 137 (1873).
71. Temple v. Cochran, 13 Mo. 116 (1850); Kingsland v. Worsham, 15 Mo. 657
(1852) ; Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v. Graham, 48 Mo. App. 638 (1892). Cf. Louis Obert
Brewing Co. v. Keller, 173 Mo. App. 410, 158, S.W. 1057 (1913).
72. Martin v. Barrett, 204 S.W. 410, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918).
73. The statute is probably redundant in listing concealment and absconding separately. Websters New International Dictionary (2d ed. unabridged, 1960) defines
abscond: "1. To hide, withdraw; be concealed. 2. To depart clandestinely; to steal off
and secrete oneself; used specifically of persons who leave the jurisdiction of a court
or secrete themselves within its jurisdiction for a fraudulent purpose, such as hindering
or defrauding creditors by avoiding legal process."
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by concealment and absconding. At the same- time, every debtor who leaves
his abode temporarily unoccupied should not be subject to attachment. The
statute need not and should not be read to mean that every plaintiff who was
unable to serve summons yesterday may attach today even though he could get
service tomorrow, or even today. It is an absence which will defeat or at least
substantially hinder service, not one which will merely delay it, that the statute
proscribes. And if the nature of the absence is to be determined as of the date
of the attachment writ, its nature will have to depend upon when the defendant
intended to return.
When the summons carried a definite return day 74 it was possible to observe
the distinction between delay and defeat of service, as the Missouri court did,
by inquiring whether the absent defendant intended to return to his abode before
the return day on an hypothetical summons issued on the day of issuance of
the attachment writ. (The summons was hypothetical because in a case begun
by attachment there need be no separate summons-the attachment writ itself
contains the summons. 75 ) But under modern Rules of Civil Procedure, including those of New Mexico 76 and Missouri, 76 a the summons of a court of general jurisdiction no longer has a return day-service is to be made "with all
reasonable diligence," defendant is directed to appear and answer within thirty
days after service, and the sheriff is to make his return promptly and in any
event within the time during which defendant must appear and plead. 77
Only in the justice courts does the summons now carry a return day. It directs
defendant to appear at a time stated, in New Mexico not less than five nor more
than twenty days from the date of the summons, and it is to be served at least
five days before the specified return day. 78 This return day might be used to
measure the length of defendant's intended absence in attachment cases in the
justice courts, although it is not clear whether the period of measurement under
the hypothetical summons should be five or twenty days. But it is of no aid in
determining whether defendant's intended absence would defeat service of
process in the district courts.
In Missouri a Supreme Court Rule 79 does direct the sheriff to return summons within thirty days of the date of issue if it cannot be served, unless the
74. See N.M. Comp. Laws §1903 (1884) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §877 (1939).
75. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§26-1-13, 26-1-15, 26-1-17, 36-7-4 (1953) ; Mo. Ann Stat.
§§521.140, 521.150, 521.170 (1953).

76. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§21-1-1(4) (b), 21-1-4(e) (5), 21-1-1(4) (f), 21-1-1(12) (1953).
But see §21-1-1 (4) (c).
76a. Mo. Ann Stat. §506.130 (1953); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 54.02. See also Mo. Sup. Ct.
R. 85.21; Mo. Civ. Proc. Form No. 1.
77. Substantially the same rules have prevailed in New Mexico since N.M. Laws
1897, ch. 73, §§19, 22 at 164, 165. Prior thereto, summons was returnable on the first day
of the next term of court after its issuance and was to be served at least five days
before the return day. N.M. Comp. Laws §§1897, 1903 (1884).

78. N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-4-2 (1953) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §517.080 (1953).
79. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 54.10(d).
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court grants an extension of time up to ninety days. This Rule might be used
to provide a measure of defendant's intended absence in the Missouri circuit
courts, although it is debatable whether the measure, should be 30 or 90
days. But there is no similar aid to measurement for attachment suits in the
New Mexico district courts.
One possible alternative would be to take as a measure the return day on the
attachment writ. This would work well enough for the justice courts, where
the writ is to specify a day not less than five nor more than fifteen days from
the date of the writ.80 Indeed, it would work better than the return day on an
hypothetical summons, since there would be an actual attachment writ with a
return day specified. But difficulties would arise in the district courts where
conflicting statutes are applicable. One statute, originating in the Kearny
Code,"' directs that original writs of attachment "shall be issued and returned
in like manner as ordinary writs of summons"-which under our Rules of
Civil Procedure now means without return day. 81 a But another provision enacted in 1897,82 as part of the same statute that abolished return day on summons,8 3 prescribes that all writs of attachment shall be returned within sixty
days from the date of delivery to the officer for service. And the 1907 revision of
the attachment laws reenacted the first statute,8 4 without repealing the second.8 5
District court clerks' responses to a questionnaire8 6 reveal that the conflict
in the statutes is reflected in the practice. The attachment writs used in Bernalillo, Chaves, Curry, Luna and Quay Counties direct the sheriff to make his
return within 30 days after service upon the defendant. The Lincoln County
writ directs a return "within thirty days," apparently of the date of the writ,
and the Dona Ana County writ gives the sheriff sixty days from receipt of
the writ to make his return. The writs of Eddy, McKinley, San Miguel and
Union Counties, obviously drafted at a time when the statutes gave a defendant
twenty days to answer after service in the district where suit was brought and
30 days after service elsewhere,8 7 give the sheriff the same time after service to
80. N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-7-3 (1953).
81. Kearny Code, Attachments §8 (1846), at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 304 (1953)
N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-15 (1953)).
81a. See text at note 77, supra.

(now

82. N.M. Laws 1897, ch. 73 §176, at 191 (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-16 (1953)).

83. See note 77, supra.
84. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107, §1 (192) at 272.
85. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107, §1 (300) at 294, repeals all of N.M. Comp. Laws, tit. 33,
ch. 2 (1897), relating to attachment, but the statute fixing a 60-day return date for writs
of attachment was compiled as N.M. Comp. Laws, tit. 33, ch 1, §2685 (176) (1897).
The 1907 revision also eliminated a recital in the attachment bond that the attachment
was returnable to the next term of court, N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107, §1(208) at 276 (now

N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-8 (1953)).
86. See note 9, supra.
87. N.M. Code §4090 (1915). N.M. Laws 1925, ch. 110, §1, at 184, amended this provision to give defendant thirty days to answer in all cases, as is now provided by
N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (4) (b) (1953).
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file his return. Apart from the difficulty of resolving this conflict,88 there is

at least a lack of logical consistency in measuring plaintiff's right to attach,
on the ground that he cannot serve summons, by his ability to serve the attachment writ rather than the summons.
Another alternative would be to abandon the notion that plaintiff's right to
attachment is to be determined on the basis of the facts as they exist on the date
of issuance of the attachment writ, and to hold that if defendant is in fact
served after issuance of the writ or enters a general appearance in the action,
plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the attachment. If defendant's appearance
to deny the allegations of the attachment affidavit were treated as a general
appearance on the merits, this would mean that an attachment on the ground
that defendant had absented himself from his abode so that process could not
be served would only be sustained where the allegation of such absence was not
challenged. If, on the other hand, defendant can challenge the affidavit by
special appearance, as the Missouri Supreme Court has decided,8 9 this would
mean that defendant could defeat attachment on this ground only by proving
that his absence had not prevented service of summons (a heavy burden for a
defendant entering a special appearance), by submitting to service, or by entering a general appearance on the merits.
As a practical matter, this would mean that plaintiff could have attachment
on this ground only when the court could not get personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, so that attachment was necessary to give the court in rem jurisdiction. Whenever the court could get personal jurisdiction, by service or
general appearance, plaintiff would lose the additional advantage of attachment
-preservation of judicial custody over defendant's property until judgment
88. New Mexico sheriffs have a considerable interest in having the conflict resolved.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§24-1-9, 26-1-16 (1953) both direct that writs of execution shall be
returned within sixty days from date of delivery to the sheriff, and a sheriff who levies
under an execution writ after the expiration of the sixty-day period acts without authority and is liable in trespass to the judgment defendant. Gallegos v. Sandoval, 15 N.M.
216, 106 Pac. 373 (1909). Hence, depending upon which of the conflicting attachment
statutes is controlling, the sheriff may be liable to plaintiff for refusing to levy more
than sixty days after receipt of the writ or to defendant for doing so.
89. State ex rel. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath, Inc. v. Harris, 349 Mo. 190, 159

S.W.2d 799 (1942). Actually defendant had appeared, not to challenge the affidavit's
allegation of non-residence, but successfully to contend that the case was not one in which
attachment was authorized. But the court defined the question broadly and announced
that defendant could by special appearance challenge the attachment on any ground,
including denial of the allegations of the affidavit. See also Whiting & Williams v.
Budd, 5 Mo. 443 (1838) ; Evans v. King, 7 Mo. 411 (1842) ; Withers v. Rodgers, 24
Mo. 340 (1857); Hisel v. Chrysler Corp., 90 F. Supp. 655 (W. D. Mo. 1950). Cf.
Smith's Adm'r v. Rollins, 25 Mo. 408 (1857).
Our court has held only that defendant can enter a special appearance for the purpose
of moving to quash the attachment action for defects apparent on the face of the writ,
Holzman v. Martinez, 2 N.M. 271 (1882) ; or on the face of the record, Waldo v. Beckwith, 1 N.M. 97 (1854). See also Colter v. Marriage, 3 N.M. (Gild. B. W. ed.) 429,
3 N.M. (Gild. E.W.S. ed.) 604, 3 N.M. (John. ed.) 351, 9 Pac. 383 (1886).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(VOL. I

on the merits. There is some logic to this result only if the sole reason for this
ground of attachment is thought to be plaintiff's inability to serve defendant personally, and not at all that plaintiff has any reason to fear that defendant will
dispose of his propertyY0
But such an argument probably proves too much. It may also be made where
plaintiff attaches on the ground of non-residence or of concealment or absconding to avoid process, although the concealed or absconding debtor may have
demonstrated such general untrustworthiness as to cause reasonable apprehension about his disposing of his property before judgment. And, in any event,
such treatment of one or more of the grounds for attachment does too much
violence to the statutory plan. Attachment laws in this country have followed
one of two patterns. Early statutes, based on the custom of London, provided
for "foreign attachment" whereby the property of an absent defendant was attached and he was allowed to appear and plead only if he first posted a "special
bail" bond which also operated to dissolve the attachment, and for "domestic
attachment" of local defendants under which defendant was not required to
post bond before being allowed to plead but could obtain dissolution of the attachment by posting bond."' Later statutes in nearly all states have eliminated
the distinction between foreign and domestic attachments. In all cases the bond
may be posted to dissolve the attachment, but the foreign defendant is no longer
required to post such bond before being allowed to plead.92
If the Missouri or New Mexico legislatures had intended to provide a unique
attachment remedy whose sole purpose was to bring defendant within the juris90. A rule that the attachment must be dismissed if the court later acquires personal
jurisdiction over the defendant would create no statute of limitations problem for two
reasons:
(a) Under N.M. Stat. Ann. §23-1-9 (1953), the statute of limitations is tolled for the
time defendant is "absent from or out of the state or concealed within the state."
This statute applies to causes of action arising within or without the state, In re
Goldsworthy's Estate, 45 N.M. 406, 115 P.2d 627 (1941), and even though defendant
has never resided within the state, Bunton v. Abernathy, 41 N.M. 684, 73 P.2d 810
(1937). But it does not apply to actions on foreign judgments, Northcutt v. King,
23 N.M. 515, 169 Pac. 473 (1917). See also In re Goldsworthy's Estate, supra.
(b) In any event under our Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's action is commenced
when the complaint is filed and not when jurisdiction is perfected. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§21-1-1 (3) (1953). And N.M. Stat. Ann. §23-1-13 (1953) specifically makes the rule
applicable for purposes of the statute of limitations. Other provisions of our Rules
authorize issuance of summons at any time within one year after the complaint is
filed, N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (4) (a) (1953), and issuance of alias summons if the
original writ is returned without service, N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(4) (1) (1953).
But the special statute dealing with limitations which provides that filing of the
complaint shall be deemed a commencement of the action also requires an "intent
that process shall issue immediately" and has been construed to require diligence
in procuring issuance of process. Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244 F.2d 511
(10th Cir. 1957). See also Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1944). Cf.
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
91. See note 1 supra,
92. Drake, Attachment, ch. 13 (7th ed. 1891) ; Waples, Attachment and Garnishment
§§762-68 (2d ed. 1895).
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diction of the court, and which was to be dissolved without bond when that
purpose was accomplished, some evidence of such intended treatment for foreign
attachments should appear in the statutes. But there is no such evidence. Nonresidence, concealment, absconding and absence from abode are listed in a single
section along with all other grounds for attachment 8 The attachment writ is
directed to he served as an ordinary summons regardless of the ground upon
which it was issued 9 4 and provision is made for substituted service in any attachment case when defendant cannot be personally served.95 In any case defendant
can controvert the grounds for attachment as alleged in attachment affidavit 96
or have the attachment dissolved by posting bond.9 7
For the reasons indicated, none of the alternatives suggested above seems feasible, at least for attachments in the district courts. Accordingly, it is suggested
that, in the case of the defendant who is absent from his abode on the day the attachment writ issued for some reason other than avoidance of process,9 8 the question whether his absence will defeat service of summons should be determined
on the basis of when he intends to return. And his intent to return should be
measured by that familiar legal concept, a reasonable time, 9 which is also the
measure of time within which process should be served upon a defendant available for service. 100 What is a reasonable time will, of course, vary with such
circumstance as the length of defendant's absence prior to issuance of the attachment writ, the extent of plaintiff's efforts to serve defendant with summons prior
to attachment, the purpose of the absence, and plaintiff's need to effect service in
order to save his rights. 1° 1 Ordinarily, defendant should not subject himself
93. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (1953) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010 (1953).
94. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-17 (Supp. 1961) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.170 (1953).
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-18 (1953) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.380 (1953) ; Mo. Ann Stat.
§506.160 (1952).

96. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-31 (1953) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.410 (1953).
97. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-30 (1953) Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.480 (1953).

98. As suggested on page 312, supra, absence for the purpose of avoiding process can
be treated as a concealment or absconding.
99. Such a measure would require overruling, or at least serious qualification, of
the decision in First Nat'l Bank v. George, 26 N.M. 176, 190 Pac. 1026 (1920). See text
at note 60 supra.
100. Under N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(4) (e) (5) (1953), service is to be made "with
all reasonable diligence." The federal courts have held that service must be made with
reasonable diligence under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(b) and 4(g), which
are substantially similar to N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(4) (b) and (f) (1953), in disposing
of motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution under Federal Rule 41 (b), which is identical with N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(41) (b) (1953). Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d
328 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Huffmaster v. United States, 186 F.Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1960);
Schram v. Koppin, 35 F.Supp. 313 (E.D. Mich. 1940). See also California Brewing Co.
v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 19 F.R.D. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ; United States v.
Greitzer, 18 F.R.D. 304 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ; Livingstone v. Hobby, 127 F.Supp. 463 (E.D.
Pa. 1954). The federal decisions would be persuasive here. See Lopez v. Singh, 53 N.M.
245, 205 P.2d 492 (1949); Carney v. McGinnis, 358 P.2d 694 (N.M. 1961). On the
action to be taken where defendant cannot be served, see text at note 104 infra.
101. See United States v. Greitzer, supra note 100; Schram v. Koppin, supra note 100.
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to attachment by leaving his abode for a month's vacation, but the result might
be different if defendant were a traveling salesman without family whose itinerary had defeated plaintiff's diligent efforts to serve him for the previous ten
months.
If the reasonable time measurement were adopted for district court attachment cases, it might be advisable in the interests of uniformity and common sense
to adopt it for justice courts also. The short five-to-twenty day return period 102
for service of an hypothetical summons is an unrealistic measure of the period
of absence which would defeat service even though justices of the peace are not
authorized to issue alias process. l03 Plaintiff should be able to dismiss his action
without prejudice when service cannot be made within this period. 10 4 If he can,
there is no need to read the return period as the measure of a reasonable time
save possibly where the statute of limitations will run within that period. 10 5 In
other cases the attachment statute should not be read to mean that justice
court attachment is the penalty for every man who does not so regulate his absence
from home that his small creditors can serve him in any three-week period of
their choice.
Third Ground: "When the debtor is about to remove his property or effects
out of the state [territory], [;] or has fraudulently concealed or disposed of his
property or effects so as to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors."' 0 6
All following the first comma was taken verbatim from Missouri, with the
102. N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-4-2 (1953).
103. Cf. the authority of district courts under N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (4) (e) (1953).
104. This quite clearly would be true in the district courts. Under our Rules of Civil
Procedure, provisions for dismissal of an action on the merits for failure to prosecute,
N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (41) (b) (1953), and for dismissal with prejudice when plaintiff
fails to take any action within two years, N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(41) (e) (1953), are
not construed to apply where "process has not been served because of inability to
execute it on account of the absence of the defendant from the state, or his concealment
within the state" or where "from some other good reason, the plaintiff is unable, for
causes beyond his control, to bring the case to trial." Ringle Dev. Corp. v. Chavez,
51 N.M. 156, 159-60, 180 P.2d 790, 792 (1947) ;Pettine v. Rogers, 63 N.M. 457, 459, 321
P.2d 638, 639 (1958). Accord, Vigil v. Johnson, 60 N.M. 273, 291 P.2d 312 (1955);
Featherstone v. Hanson, 65 N.M. 398, 338 P.2d 298 (1959). See also Otero v. Sandoval,
60 N.M. 444, 292 P.2d 319 (1956) ;Pueblo De Taos v. Archuleta, 64 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.
1933). See also Costello v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 534 (1961) ; Smith v. Ford Gum
& Machine Co., 212 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1954) ;Thomas v. Furness (Pac.) Ltd., 171 F.2d
434 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 960 (1949) ; Bucholz v. Hutton, 153 F. Supp.
62 (D. Mont. 1957) ;Myers v. Westland Oil Co., 96 F.Supp. 667 (D. N.D. 1949) (construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), from which N.M. Stat. Ann.
§21-1-1 (41) (b) (1953) was copied).
105. Even this qualification may be unnecessary. N.M. Stat. Ann. §23-1-14 (1953),
provides that if an action fails "for any cause, except negligence of prosecution, and a
new suit be commenced within six months thereafter," the second suit shall, for purposes
of the statute of limitations, "be deemed a continuation of the first." See Miller v. Smith,
59 N.M. 235, 282 P.2d 715 (1955).
106. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (3) (1953). Kearny Code, Attachments §1(3) (1846) at
1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303 (1953).
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word "defraud" inserted.' 07 But that which precedes the first comma is a substantial contraction of a separate ground for attachment in Missouri: "Where the
debtor is about to remove his property or effects out of this state, with the intent
to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors."' 0 8 The express requirement of intent
the Kearny draftsmen eliminated. What is not so clear is whether the contemplated removal of property from the state, as well as a concealment or
disposition of property, must be "so as to" defraud, hinder or delay creditors.
"So as to" apparently refers to effect rather than intent.109 If that language is
applicable to a contemplated removal of property from the state, our statute
substitutes a test of the effect of the removal for the Missouri test of the defendant's intent.
So far as punctuation is a guide to meaning, the matter is not free from
doubt. What is now the first comma in the New Mexico provision was, in the
Kearny Code, a semicolon. This punctuation was preserved in subsequent revisions and compilations" unti 1897111 when the comma was substituted.
The new punctuation was perpetuated in the 1907 reenactment 112 and in
subsequent amendments thereto." 13
Our court has not considered the matter. But if it is to be assumed that the
Kearny draftsmen used the semi-colon deliberately to separate completely independent phrases and to eliminate any inquiry into the effect of a contemplated
removal of property from the state, there is as much reason to assume that the
1897 compilers changed the semicolon to a comma with equal deliberation to
require an inquiry into the effect of removal, 11 4 although such a purpose would
have been better implemented if a comma had also been inserted after the second
appearance of the word "effects." If, on the other hand, no significance is attached to the use of the semicolon in the Kearny Code, and all grounds there
specified are to be tested by their effect, no contrary significance can be attached
107. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §1(6) (1845). The Missouri language was later
revised to cover the defendant who has fraudulently "concealed, removed or disposed"
of his property so as to hinder or delay his creditors. (Emphasis added.) Mo. Rev. Stat.
ch. 12, art. I, §1(8) (1885) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010(8) (1953).
108. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §1(4) (1845) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010(5) (1953).
(Emphasis added).
109. Cf. the similar interpretation of the statutory language "so that" under the
second ground for attachment at p. 312, supra.
110. N.M. Rev. Stat. ch. 2, §1 (1854); N.M. Rev. Stat. ch. 31, §1 (1865) ; N.M.

Comp. Laws tit. 23, ch. 7, §1923 (1884).
111. N.M. Comp. Laws tit. 23, ch. 2, §2686(3) (1897).
112. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107, §1 (182) (3), at 270.
113. N.M. Laws 1917, ch. 113, §3(3), at 325. N.M. Laws 1929, ch. 127, §1(3), at 289,
(now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1(3) (1953)).
114. The Act authorizing the 1897 compilation provided that "the laws so compiled

shall be received by all the courts and officers of this territory, and shall in all respects
be as valid and as binding as [an] original enrolled act approved and filed in the office
of the Secretary of the Territory as now provided by law." N.M. Laws 1897, ch. 43,
§7, at 85.
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to the later substitution of the comma. 115 In either event, the statute as it now
reads would be construed as requiring that the defendant be about to remove
his property from the state so as to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors.
Since the test is effect rather than intent, the plaintiff may have an easier case
under the removal provision in New Mexico than in Missouri. In the latter
state, where the contemplated removal of property from the state must be with
intent to defraud, hinder or delay, a defendant in the business of shipping goods
out-of-state has been able to avoid attachment because of the absence of such
intent.116 Here, such contemplated shipments by a financially embarrassed defendant might provide grounds for attachment, if defendant was not to receive, within the state, an immediate payment or exchange of goods of equal
value, or was not to acquire an account payable by an obligor subject to garnishment within the state, so as to avoid the effect of at least hindering or delaying his creditors. 1 7 This analysis assumes that the contemplated removal
of "property or effects" covered by the statute need not be of all of the debtor's
property, but only of enough to defraud, hinder or delay creditors because of
an insufficient remainder in the state. If the statute applied only where all of
the debtor's property was to be removed, any inquiry as to the effect of such
removal on creditors would be superfluous.
In any event, the plaintiff must be prepared to show that defendant "is about
to" remove his property from the state. If he has already done so before the
attachment writ issues, plaintiff has acted too late.118 But plaintiff need not show
that defendant intends an "immediate" removal. If he had to wait until this
115. See Robinson v. Hesser, 4 N.M. 282, 13 Pac. 204 (1887), where both the plaintiff in his attachment affidavit, Id. at 285, 13 Pac. at 204, and the court in its opinion,
Id. at 286, 13 Pac. at 205, substituted a comma for the semicolon then in the statute.
116. Switzer v. Carson, 9 Mo. 740 (1846). Cf. Crow v. Marshall, 15 Mo. 499 (1852).
117. Since the statute specifies "defraud, hinder or delay" in the disjunctive, any one
will do. Dunham-Buckley & Co. v. Halberg, 69 Mo. App. 509 (1897). Cf. Stewart v.
Cabanne, 16 Mo. App. 517 (1885).
118. This is the interpretation placed upon another ground for attachment in Missouri: "Where the defendant is about fraudulently to conceal, remove or dispose of his
property or effects, so as to hinder or delay his creditors. .. ." Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010
(1953). (Emphasis added.) Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1(IV) (1953). See Mathewson
v. Larson-Myers Co., 217 S.W. 609, 612 (Mo. App. 1919), which recognizes that evidence of past transfers may be admissible as tending to show "further contemplated
conveyances." The fact that a conveyance is actually made after attachment is not
enough to establish the right to attach on this ground. Plaintiff must show that the conveyance was contemplated by the defendant at the time the writ issued. Scudder v.
Payton, 65 Mo. App. 314 (1896) ; Best & Russell Co. v. Meyerfield, 77 Mo. App. 181
(1898). But a fraudulent conveyance made after plaintiff brings suit will afford a
ground for ancillary attachment which is available under N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-43
(1953) at any time before judgment. See Kingman & Co. v. Cornell-Tebetts Machine
& Buggy Co., 150 Mo. 282, 51 S.W. 727 (1899).
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could be shown, his attachment might well come too late. 119 It is enough to
show that there is "present in the mind of the debtor a purpose to [remove]
which he is on the verge of executing."' 120
The alternative grounds for attachment under this provision-that defendant has fraudulently concealed or disposed of his property so as to defraud, hinder
or delay creditors-differ from the contemplated removal of property from the
state in at least two significant respects. They deal with accomplished facts,
concealment or disposition, 12

1

not with what defendant is about to do. 122 And

they require that the 'concealment or removal be done "fraudulently," which
connotes a wrongful intent.
One obvious form of concealment is shown were defendant has converted
his property to cash and concealed the proceeds. 1 23 And defendant cannot defeat attachment by showing that he intended to use the concealed money to
defend anticipated attachment suits, or by producing his hidden funds after
119. Again, this is by analogy to the interpretation placed on another ground for
attachment in Missouri, which was not adopted here: "Where the defendant is about
to remove out of this state, with intent to change his domicile. . . ." Mo. Ann. Stat.
§521.010(6) (1953). (Emphasis added.) See Elliot v. Keith, 32 Mo. App. 579 (1888).
120. Once again, by analogy to another ground for attachment: "When the debtor
is about fraudulently to convey or assign, conceal or dispose of his property or effects,
so as to hinder or delay his creditors . . ." N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (IV) (1953). (Emphasis added.) See C. J. L. Meyer & Sons Co. v. Black, 4 N.M. 352, 368-69, 16 Pac. 620,
626 (1888), holding insufficient an affidavit that defendant "has attempted fraudulently
to convey" as not stating "a present purpose to do something which is likely to be accomplished at any moment. ..."
121. A disposition or conveyance of property contemplates some affirmative or at
least cooperative action of the debtor. A confession of judgment may constitute a
fraudulent conveyance. Field & Beardslee v. Liverman, 17 Mo. 218 (1852) ; Rainwater
v. Faconeoswich, 29 Mo. App. 26 (1888) ; Gries v. Blackman, 30 Mo. App. 2 (1888) ;
H. S. Burr & Co. v. Frank Mathers & Co., 51 Mo. App. 470 (1892). Cf. Estes v. Fry,
22 Mo. App. 80 (1886). But a judgment in litigation which the debtor contested in
good faith, or the mere fact that other creditors have attached, will not. Mathewson
v. Larson-Myers Co., 217 S.W. 609 (Mo. App. 1919). And see Heideman-Benoist Saddlery Co. v. Urner & Prewett, 24 Mo. App. 534 (1887). And it is no ground for attachment that defendant has insufficient property within the state unless his condition is
the result of removal or fraudulent concealment or disposition. Sullivan v. Michelli,
35, N.M. 59, 289 Pac. 803 (1930).
122. Bauer Grocery Co. v. Smith, 74 Mo. App. 419, 424 (1898), suggests that the
attaching plaintiff may avail himself of any fraudulent conveyance made within the
period of the statute of limitations on his underlying claim. Cf. Douglass Candy Co. v.
Shenk, 195 Mo. App. 592, 194 S.W. 754 (1917).
123. First Nat'l Bank v. Lesser & Lewinson, 9 N.M. 604, 58 Pac. 345 (1899) ; Powell
v. Matthews, 10 Mo. 49 (1846) ; Mathews v. Loth, 45 Mo. App. 455 (1891). See also
Mahner v. Linck, 70 Mo. App. 380 (1897), finding a concealment where defendant
withdrew his money from one bank and deposited it in another, and was unable to give
any reason for so doing. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Lesser & Lewinson, 10 N.M. 700, 65
Pac. 179 (1901), where plaintiff was unable to make his proof on the theory that defendant had concealed funds from an assignee for the benefit of creditors.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. I

attachment. 24 One Missouri Court of Appeals has also treated as evidence of
concealment the fact that a mortgage on a merchant's stock of goods is left
on record after all of the mortgaged stock has been disposed of, since the mortgage may then appear to cover new stock. 125 And, since "account books" are
expressly subject to attachment levy in Missouri, 12 another Court of Appeals
has concluded that concealment of such books to prevent levy upon them is a
ground for attachment. 127 The same court has concluded that it will not avail
the defendant to plead that he concealed the property from one creditor to
preserve it for another. "The law will uphold an executed preference, but not
128
an executory preference with an intermediate concealment."'
With regard to a fraudulent "disposition" of property, the Missouri courts
have gone to extraordinary lengths to give the concept some meaning apart
from a fraudulent "concealment," and apart from a fraudulent "conveyance"
or "assignment," which is a separate ground for attachment in Missouri.' 29 The
Missouri solution is that transfers which require written documents to be effective are "conveyances" or "assignments," while "dispositions" include confessed judgments and such "pledges, gifts, pawns, bailments and other transfers and alienations as may be effected by mere delivery, and without the use of
any writing, assignment or conveyance."' 3I This of course, introduces into the
attachment law a distinction which is not observed in the substantive law allowing creditors to avoid fraudulent conveyances, under the fraudulent conveyance
statute in force in Missouri since 1804,131 under the common law doctrine of
124. Mathews v. Loth, supra note 123. Defendant is not estopped to contest attachment by the fact that he previously told plaintiff his property was "all covered up,"
since he has not "unequivocally" declared that it was either concealed or conveyed.
Staed v. Mahon, 70 Mo. App. 400 (1897).
125. Bauer Grocery Co. v. Smith, 61 Mo. App. 665 (1895), 74 Mo. App. 419 (1898).
See also Field & Beardlslee v. Liverman, 17 Mo. 218 (1852), indicating that concealment
was found from the fact that the defendant confessed judgment for his brother-in-law,
who then had a writ of execution issued, but delayed the levy thereunder until plaintiff
delivered an attachment writ to the sheriff.
126. Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.240 (1953). New Mexico has not adopted this provision. If
account books are subject to levy here it is under less specific statutory provisions,
adapted from Missouri, prescribing that the writ shall command the sheriff to attach
the defendant by his "lands and tenements, goods, moneys, effects, credits and all other
property and interests in property of whatsoever nature and kind," N.M. Stat. Ann.
§26-1-13 (1953) ; cf. Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.140 (1953) ; and directing the sheriff to seize,
when accessible, "goods and chattels, moneys, effects, evidences of debt or other personal
property.
... N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-17 (1953). Cf. Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.170(4) (1953).
127. Dodson-Hills Mfg. Co. v. Payton, 65 Mo. App. 311 (1896).
128. Dodson-Hills Mfg. Co. v. Payton, supra note 127, at 314. Cf. note 162, infra.
129. Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010(7) (1953). The fraudulent conveyance or assignment,
like the fraudulent concealment or disposition, must be made "so as to hinder or delay
his creditors. . ....
130. Bullene v. Smith, 73 Mo. 151, 161 (1880) ; Conran v. Fenn, 159 Mo. App. 664,
140 S.W. 82 (1911) ; Douglass Candy Co. v. Shenk, 195 Mo. App. 592, 194 S.W. 754
(1917).
131. Mo. Laws 1804, at 19, (now Mo. Ann. Stat. §§428-010 through 428.110 (1953)).
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fraudulent conveyance 132 followed in New Mexico 133 until 1959, nor under
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act adopted'in New Mexico in that
13 4

year.
There is a separate and compelling reason for not adopting the distinction
under the New Mexico attachment law. Unless all fraudulent conveyances are
treated as fraudulent "dispositions," they constitute no ground for attachment

here.135 In point of fact, New Mexico creditors have, without challenge on
this point, treated as fraudulent dispositions a written assignment of a stock
of merchandise,

136

a chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise, 137 a written

deed of assignment covering lumber and "certain mining property,"' 138 and a
"deed," apparently of realty.'

39

Our court and the Missouri courts have recognized that the requirement
that the concealment or disposition be done
of fraudulent intent.14 0 But in the case of
stantive law of fraudulent conveyance, this
by showing actual intent to defraud or by

"fraudulently" imparts an element
a conveyance, as is true in the subrequirement may be satisfied either
showing an effect which the court

132. See 1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, chs. XIIA, XIIB (rev.
ed. 1940).
133. The fraudulent conveyance statutes of 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1571), and 27 Eliz., ch. 4
(1585), were adopted with the common law in New Mexico. Marchbanks v. McCullough,
47 N.M. 13, 16, 132 P.2d 426, 428 (1943). Although none reached the Supreme Court,
any attempt to set aside a transfer as a fraudulent conveyance before the 1876 enactment of N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-3-3 (1953) making the common law the "rule of practice
and decision" in this state, presumably would have been decided according to the civil
law of Mexico. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. 34 (1853), aff'd 61 U.S. (20 How.)
176 (1857) (where an assignment for the benefit of creditors was held invalid under
the Mexican Civil Code and therefore a fraudulent disposition under the attachment
statute) ; Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919) ; Field v. Otero, 35 N.M. 68,
290 Pac. 1015 (1930).
134. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§50-14-1 through 50-14-13 (1953). "Conveyance" is defined
in §50-14-1 to include "every payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease,
mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of any lien
or incumbrance."
135. Though the nimble plaintiff may attach where defendant "is about fraudulently
to convey or assign, conceal or dispose of" his property so as to hinder or delay his
creditors. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (IV) (1953).
r36. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. 34 (1853), aff'd 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176 (1857).
137. Spiegelberg v. Hersch, 3 N.M. (Guild. B.W. ed.) 204, 3 N.M. (Gild. E. W. S.
ed.) 281, 3 N.M. (John. ed.) 185, 4 Pac. 705 (1884).
138. C. J. L. Meyer & Sons v. Black, 4 N.M. 352, 369, 16 Pac. 620, 627 (1888) (the
statute "contemplates any kind of fraudulent disposition whether by deed or otherwise.
139. First Nat'l Bank v. Lesser & Lewinson, 9 N.M. 604, 58 Pac. 345 (1899).
140. The intent must be to defraud creditors. Defendant's sale of property which does
not belong to him is not a fraudulent conveyance. Ring v. Ring, 12 Mo. App. 88 (1882).
Neither, without more, is sale of goods which he has not yet paid for. Steinwender v.
Creath, 44 Mo. App. 356 (1891). Cf. Houser v. Andersch, 61 Mo. App. 15 (1895);
Kramer v. Wilson, 22 Mo. App. 173 (1886). Nor is the giving of a mortgage to secure
a debt bearing usurious interest. Adler & Sons Clothing Co. v. Corl, 155 Mo. 149, 55
S.W. 1017 (1900).
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is willing to label fraudulent as a matter of law. Thus, a gratuitous transfer
1 42
by a debtor who is thereby left insolvent is fraudulent as a matter of law.
So, in Missouri, is a shifting stock mortgage were the mortgagor is not required
to account to the mortgagee for the proceeds of sale 14 3 -a view once adopted
but later rejected by our court 144 and now rejected also by the Uniform Com146
mercial Code. 145 So also, in Missouri, is a deed absolute given as security only.
And in New Mexico an assignment for the benefit of creditors which fails in
substantial respects to comply with statutory requirements has been treated as
147
a fraudulent conveyance as a matter of law, entitling creditors to attach.
141. "[A]ny form of disposal accompanied by fraud in fact, as an intention to prevent the collection of debts, or by fraud in law, arising from the inevitable tendency
of his act to unreasonably hinder and delay such collection, will support the action."
C. J. L. Meyer & Sons v. Black, 4 N.M. 352, 369-70, 16 Pac. 620, 627; Torlina v. Trorlicht,
5 N.M. 148, 21 Pac. 69 (1889) aff'd on rehearing, 6 N.M. 54, 27 Pac. 794 (1891) ; Reed
v. Pelletier, 28 Mo. 173 (1859); Enders v. Richards, 33 Mo. 598 (1863) ; Spencer v.
Deagle, 34 Mo. 455 (1864) ; State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Trimble, 315 Mo. 966,
287 S.W. 432 (1926) ; Jacob Furth Grocery Co. v. May, 78 Mo. App. 323 (1899);
Bowles Live Stock Comm'n Co. v. Hunter, 91 Mo. App. 333 (1902) ; First Nat'l Bank
v. Kibble, 221 Mo. App. 311, 273 S.W. 148 (1925). Cf. Beach v. Baldwin, 14 Mo. 597
(1851). But where intent is established by effect, a delaying or hindering effect must
be unreasonable. The reasonable delay incident to liquidating the debtor's property,
by sale or assignment for the benefit of creditors, does not without more establish
fraudulent intent. Torlina v. Trorlicht, supra.
142. First Nat'l Bank v. McClellan, 9 N.M. 636, 58 Pac. 347 (1899) (not an attachment case) ; Rogers v. Balduini, 28 N.M. 102, 206 Pac. 514 (1922) (not an attachment
case) ; Merchants Bank v. Dunn, 41 N.M. 432, 70 P.2d 760 (1937) (not an attachment
case) ; Portales Nat'l Bank v. Beeman, 52 N.M. 243, 196 P.2d 876 (1948) (not an attachment case) ; Bucks v. Moore, 36 Mo. App. 529 (1889) ; Cooper v. Standley, 40 Mo. App.
138 (1890); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Price, 41 Mo. App. 291 (1890) ; Glacier
v. Walker, 69 Mo. App. 288 (1897) ; American Nat'l Bank v. Thornburrow, 109 Mo.
App. 639, 83 S.W. 771 (1904) ; Hunter v. Anthony, 209 Mo. App. 1, 236 S.W. 412 (1922).
143. Reed v. Pelletier, 28 Mo. 173 (1859) ; Rock Island Nat'l Bank v. Powers, 134 Mo.
432, 34 S.W. 869, 35 S.W. 1132 (1896) ; Eby, Dowden & Co. v. Watkins, 39 Mo. App.
27 (1890) ; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Jenkins, 47 Mo. App. 664 (1892) ; Sauer v. Behr, 49 Mo.
App. 86 (1892) ; Bank of Elkhart v. Western Lumber Co., 59 Mo. App. 317 (1894) ;
Bauer Grocery Co. v. Smith, 61 Mo. App. 665 (1895) ; Sauerwein v. Renard Champagne Co., 68 Mo. App. 29 (1896) ; Kahmke v. Weber, 187 Mo. App. 698, 173 S.W. 76
(1915). Cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Davis, 117 F. Supp. 3 (W. D. Mo. 1953).
144. Spiegelberg v. Hersch, 3 N.M. (Gild. B. W. ed.) 204, 3 N.M. (Gild. E. W. S. ed.)
281, 3 N.M. (John ed.) 185, 4 Pac. 705 (1884), overruled in First Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 13 N.M. 551, 86 Pac. 622 (1906) (not an attachment case) and First Nat'l Bank v.
Haverkampf, 16 N.M. 497, 121 Pac. 31 (1911), aff'd 235 U.S. 689 (1914) (not an attachment case).
145. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50A-9-205 (Supp. 1961) (effective Jan. 1, 1962).
146. Rock Island Nat'l Bank v. Powers, 134 Mo. 432, 34 S.W. 869, 35 S.W. 1132
(1896) ; Hunter v. Anthony, 209 Mo. App. 1, 236 S.W. 412 (1922).
147. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. 34 (1853). This case involved provisions of the
Mexican Civil Code then applicable here. Presumably, the same result would follow
under our assignment statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§27-1-1 through 27-1-53 (1953). Since
failure to comply with the assignment statute is not necessarily evidence of fraudulent
intent, treatment of the defective assignment as a fraudulent conveyance rather than
as an ineffective conveyance seems questionable. Apart from statutory requirement,
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The Missouri courts have also, by highly dubious reasoning, found a substitute for the defendant's intent to defraud in the transferee's failure to comply
with statutory notoriety requirements. Thus, the chattel mortgage recording
act, providing that the mortgage "shall not be valid against any other person"
unless recorded or unless possession of the property is delivered to the mortgagee,' 48 has been construed as rendering an unrecorded mortgage with the
mortgagor in possession a fraudulent conveyance as a matter of law under
the attachment statute. 149 But the court was influenced by the fact that the
recording statutes for chattel mortgages and conditional sales at the time of
decision appeared in the official code as part of the chapter on fraudulent conveyances, 150 a peculiarity now obtaining in Missouri only with respect to conditional sales, 1"1 and one which never existed in New Mexico where our recording statutes long preceded any statute dealing with fraudulent conveyances.
And our court has held, in a case arising not on attachment but on the efforts
of a bankruptcy trustee to set aside a chattel mortgage as a fraudulent conveyance, that a thirteen-month delay in recording does not render the mortgage
fraudulent as a matter of law and is not even evidence of fraudulent intent in
2
the absence of an agreement for such delay between mortgagor and mortgagee."11
Other cases 15; suggest, though they do not hold, that a sale made without
compliance with the Missouri Bulk Sales Act is a fraudulent conveyance under
the attachment statute, since that Act pronounces such sales "fraudulent and
void against all creditors of the vendor ' 154 (emphasis added), but this tenuous
an assignment for the benefit of creditors is not a fraudulent conveyance merely because
some delay for creditors is involved in the orderly liquidation of the property by the
assignee. Torlina v. Trorlicht, 5 N.M. 148, 21 Pac. 69 (1889). Nor is an assignment a
fraudulent conveyance merely because it authorizes, but does not direct, the assignee
to sell on credit, at least where the assignee made no sales on more than thirty days'
credit. C. J. L. Meyer & Sons. v. Black, 4 N.M. 352, 16 Pac. 620 (1888). See also Ring
v. Ring, 12 Mo. App. 88 (1882) ; Douglas v. Cissna, 17 Mo. App. 44 (1885); Third
Nat'l Bank v. Cramer, 78 Mo. App. 476 (1899).
148. Mo. Ann. Stat. §443.460 (1952). A 1959 amendment has slightly revised the
quoted language.
149. Rock Island Nat'l Bank v. Powers, 134 Mo. 432, 34 S.W. 869, 35 S.W. 1132
(1896). See also Bank of Elkhart v. Western Lumber Co., 59 Mo. App. 317 (1894).
Cf. Sauerwein v. Renard Champagne Co., 68 Mo. App. 29 (1896); Sauer v. Behr,
49 Mo. App. 86 (1892).
150. Mo. Rev. Stat. 05176, 5180 (1889).
151. Mo. Ann. Stat. §428.100 (1952). The chattel mortgage recording statute and
statutes dealing with fraudulent conveyances appear as separate articles of a chapter
on conveyances in Mo. Rev. Stat. (1909 in ch. 30, and now appear separately in Mo.
Ann. Stat. (1952) as chs. 428 and 443.
152. First Nat'l Bank v. Haverkampf, 16 N.M. 497, 121 Pac. 31 (1911), aff'd 235 U.S.
689 (1914).
153. Joplin Supply Co. v. Smith, 182 Mo. App. 212, 167 S.W. 649 (1914); Riley
Pennsylvania Oil Co. v. Symmonds, 195 Mo. App. 111, 190 S.W. 1038 (1916). See also
Douglass Candy Co. v. Shenk, 195 Mo. App. 592, 194 S.W. 754 (1917).
154. Mo. Ann. Stat. §427.020 (1953).
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basis for the suggestion is not available under our Act, which simply pronounces
1 55
such sales "void"-and which will soon pronounce them only "ineffective."'
And one case' 5 6 recognizes under the attachment statute a sale of personalty not
accompanied by change of possession as a fraudulent conveyance, apparently
because another statute included in the fraudulent conveyance chapter of the
Missouri code, but with no counterpart in New Mexico, pronounces such sales
7
"fraudulent and void" against creditors of the vendor.'
The plaintiff's case is easier in one respect where he alleges a fraudulent conveyance as a ground for attachment than were he seeks to set the conveyance
aside. Under the attachment statute the good or bad faith of the transferee is
immaterial. 158 But since under the attachment statute the conveyance must
have been made "fraudulently" and "so as to defraud, hinder or delay creditors,"
both the debtor's intent and the effect on creditors must be shown, as the Missouri cases have frequently recognized, 15 9 and as most courts require in applying
the common law doctrine of fraudulent conveyance in a creditor's suit to set
a transfer aside.' 60 Where the effect is sufficiently apparent, the intent will be
deemed proved thereby, which is the rationale for finding a conveyance fraudulent as a matter of law.' 6 ' But the injurious effect to creditors should be established in each case, whether the conveyance is to be held fraudulent as a
matter of law or fraudulent because of the debtor's actual intent to defraud,
hinder or delay creditors. 162
155. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-10-1 (1953). It is Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which will replace the Bulk Sales Act on January 1, 1962, under which bulk sales
not made in compliance with statutory requirements are "ineffective" against creditors.
N. M. Stat. Ann. §§50A-6-104, 50A-6-105 (Supp. 1961).
156. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Pfeil, 35 Mo. App. 256 (1889).
157. Mo. Ann. Stat. §428.080 (1953). Under the Uniform Commercial Code, creditors of the seller may after January 1, 1962, treat a sale where the seller retains possession as "void" if such a sale "is fraudulent under any rule of law of the state where
the goods are situated" save that retention of possession in good faith and current
course of trade by a merchant-seller for "a commercially reasonable time" after sale
"is not fraudulent." N.M. Stat. Ann. §50A-2-402 (Supp. 1961). We have no such "rule
of law" and dictum in Heisch v. J. L. Bell & Co., 11 N.M. 523, 529, 70 Pac. 572 (1902)
indicates that retention of possession by the seller "is only prima facie evidence of fraud,
which may be rebutted by proof showing the bona fides of the transaction."
158. Enders v. Richards, 33 Mo. 698 (1863); National Tube Works Co. v. Ring
Refrigerating & Ice Mach. Co., 118 Mo. 365, 22 S.W. 947 (1893) ; Sauer v. Behr, 49
Mo. App. 86 (1892) ; Shull v. Kallauner, 222 Mo. App. 64, 300 S.W. 554 (1927).
159. Enders v. Richards, 33 Mo. 598 (1863) ;Spencer v. Deagle, 34 Mo. 455 (1864)
Douglas v. Cissna, 170 Mo. App. 44 (1885); Glacier v. Walker, 69 Mo. App. 288 (1897)
Jacob Furth Grocery Co. v. May, 78 Mo. App. 323 (1899) ; American Nat'l Bank v.
Thornburrow, 109 Mo. App. 639, 83 S.W. 771 (1904) ; Conran v. Fenn, 159 Mo. App.
664, 140 S.W.82 (1911).
160. Glenn, supra note 132, §§266-68.
161. See note 141 supra.
162. One type of injury to creditors-relative disparity of treatment-is not encompassed by the substantive law of fraudulent conveyance or by the attachment statute.
A transfer by an insolvent debtor given as bona fide payment of or security for a debt
is a preference but not a fraudulent conveyance. Field v. Otero, 32 N.M. 338, 255 Pac.
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In several cases the Missouri courts seem to have lost sight of this requirement of the attachment statute. The fact that the debtor has sufficient property
10 3
remaining after the conveyance to pay all of his debts is held to be immaterial.
Another requirement imposed by some courts, in the creditor's suit to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance, seems to have been carried over to the fraudulent
conveyance as a ground for attachment, with dubious propriety. The creditor
seeking to set aside a fraudulent conveyance who did not extend credit until
after the conveyance was made is, in some jurisdictions, required to prove that
the debtor's fraudulent purpose was addressed to future creditors, or at least
that future creditors were in contemplation. 0 4 One Missouri Court of Appeals
has imposed the same requirement on a post-conveyance creditor seeking to treat
the fraudulent conveyance as a ground for attachment.' 65 And our court has
assumed that it would apply under the attachment statute, but avoided application by finding that the note upon which the creditor sued was given in renewal of a pre-conveyance note, so that he could qualify as an existing creditor. 66
Whatever the validity of this requirement in an action designed to remedy an
injury to creditors by setting aside the conveyance, it has no apparent validity
under the attachment statute. That statute is not designed to provide a remedy
for injury, but to allow creditors to prevent further injury at the hands of a
debtor who has demonstrated by one injurious act that there is cause for further
apprehension. The fact that the debtor has made a fraudulent conveyance, when
the fact is discovered, gives as good a cause for apprehension to a post-conveyance
creditor as to existing creditors. Hence, the decision of another Missouri Court
785 (1927) (not an attachment case) ; Addison v. Tessier, 65 N.M. 222, 226-27, 335 P.2d
554, 556-57 (19.59) (not an attachment case) (collecting authority) ; Foster v. Mullanphy
Planing Mill Co., 92 Mo. 79, 4 S.W. 260 (1887) ; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. Joy, 9 Mo. App.
47 (1880); Estes v. Fry, 22 Mo. App. 80 (1886) ; Deering & Co. v. Collins, 38 Mo. App. 80
(1889) ; Smith & Co. v. National Ry. Elec. & Industrial Exposition Ass'n, 47 Mo. App.
462 (1892). Cf. National Tube Works Co. v. Ring Refrigerating & Ice Mach. Co.,
118 Mo. 365, 22 S.W. 947 (1893) ; Gries v. Blackman, 30 Mo. App. 2 (1888). An unsuccessful attempt to prefer a creditor by inducing him to attach when he has no grounds
for attachment, likewise gives creditors no ground for attachment. Heideman-Benoist
Saddlery Co. v. Urner & Prewitt, 24 Mo. App. 534 (1887). Cf. text at note 128 supra.
163. Rock Island Nat'l Bank v. Powers, 134 Mo. 432, 34 S.W. 869, 35 S.W. 1132
(1896) ; Bank of Elkhart v. Western Lumber Co., 59 Mo. App. 317 (1894) ; Dixon Nat'l
Bank v. Western Lumber Co., 68 Mo. App. 81 (1896). Barry County Bank v. Russey,
74 Mo. App. 651 (1898), attempts to limit this treatment to cases where the debtor's
actual intent to defraud is shown, but all of the cases previously cited involved conveyances held fraudulent as a matter of law. The same notion seems to prevail in
cases holding that the debtor's intent to hinder, delay or defraud other creditors may
convert a preferential transfer into a fraudulent conveyance. Nelson Distilling Co. v.
Creath, 45 Mo. App. 169 (1871) ; Barry County Bank v. Russey, supra.
164. Glenn, supra note 132, ch. XVIII(A) ; Notes 40 Ky. L.J. 433 (1952), 30 Colum. L.
Rev. 202 (1930), 37 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1924).
165. Bauer Grocery Co. v. Smith, 74 Mo. App. 419 (1898).
166. First Nat'l Bank v. Lesser & Lewinson, 9 N.M. 604, 58 Pac. 345 (1899). See
also First Nat'l Bank v. McClellan, 9 N.M. 636, 58 Pac. 347 (1899) (not an attachment
case).
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of Appeals, that if the conveyance was fraudulent as to any creditor all may
67
attach, seems preferable.'
Further difficufties in reconciling the concept of a fraudulent conveyance
as a ground for attachment, with the concept of a fraudulent conveyance which
a creditor can set aside, are presented by the 1959 adoption of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act in New Mexico. That Act defines three types of
conveyances which are fraudulent as a matter of law:
(1) One made without fair consideration"' where the debtor is left insolvent'"'-such a transfer is "fraudulent as to creditors without regard
170
to . ..actual intent."'
(2) One made without fair consideration by a debtor engaging or about to
engage in a business or transaction for which the property remaining in
his hands would be an unreasonably small capital-such a conveyance
is "fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or transaction without
71
regard to . .. actual intent.'
(3) One made without fair consideration when the debtor intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they maturesuch a conveyance is "fraudulent as to both present and future
1 72
creditors."'
In addition, the Act defines a fourth type of fraudulent conveyance:
(4) One made "with actual intent, as distinguished from the intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud either present or future creditors"-such a conveyance "is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors." 173
Obviously, the three definitions of conveyances fraudulent as a matter of law,
with their various distinctions as to the classes of creditors who can treat the
conveyance as fraudulent for purposes of setting it aside or obtaining other individual relief, 1 74 will perpetuate the question whether creditors not in the desig167. Noyes, Norman & Co. v. Cunningham, 51 Mo. App. 194 (1892). If any creditor

is to be barred it should be only the post-conveyance creditor who knew of the fraudulent conveyance at the time he extended credit.
168. Fair consideration is defined in N.M. Stat. Ann §50-14-3 (1953). Since the
definition allows a transfer by which "as fair equivalent therefor . . . an antecedent
debt is satisfied" or a transfer "to secure . . . . antecedent debt in an amount not disproportionately small," the preferential transfer (see note 162, supra) is still not a fraudulent conveyance.
169. The Act contains its own definition of insolvency. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-2
(1953).
170. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-4 (1953).
171. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-5 (1953).
172. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-6 (1953).
173. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-7 (1953).
174. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§50-14-9, 50-14-10 (1953).
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nated classes may treat the conveyance as a ground for attachment. Moreover,
there is the question of the exclusiveness of the Act's definitions of conveyances
fraudulent as a matter of law. Is the court still free to formulate additional
definitions, either for the purpose of affording creditors a remedy against the
transfer made or for the purpose of attachment law? The four definition suggests that all fraudulent conveyances which cannot be brought under one of
the previous three definitions must be found to have been made with actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud. But a general saving provision in the Act provides that, "in any case
7
not provided for in this act the rules of law and equity . .. shall govern."' -,
And federal courts, construing this provision in other states, have read it to
mean that common law concepts of the conveyance fraudulent as a matter of
law, not embodied in the Act's three definitions, are still applicable.' 76
The fourth definition raises an additional problem, since it turns entirely
upon the debtor's intent without regard to the actual effect upon creditors. By
virtue of another provision of the Uniform Act, a transferee who has given fair
consideration, so that no injury to creditors results from the transfer, is protected if he is "without knowledge of the fraud."' 17 7 But where the debtor's
fraudulent intent and the transferee's knowledge thereof are established, it is
recognized that injury to creditors is no element of the Act's fourth definition
of a fraudulent conveyance. 178 Does this mean that under the attachment statute, where the transferee's bad faith is irrelevant, 17 9 the only requirement now
is that the debtor be guilty of actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud? That
conclusion could be reached only on the unwarranted assumption that the
Uniform Act was intended to amend the attachment statute by repealing, for
fraudulent dispositions only, its requirement that the disposition be made "so
as to defraud, hinder, or delay creditors." 80
Fourth Ground: "When the debtor is about fraudulently to convey or assign,
conceal or dispose of his property or effects, so as to hinder or delay his creditors."
The Kearny Code combined separate Missouri grounds for contemplated
conveyance or assignment and contemplated concealment or disposition, and
altered the concluding phrase of require that the contemplated action be "so
175. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-11 (1953).
176. Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348 (1932) ; Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 54 F.2d
518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 547 (1931).
177. N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-9 (1953).
178. Joseph P. Manning Co. v. Shinopoulous, 317 Mass. 97, 56 N.E.2d 869 (1944);
Scholtz v. Yastrzemski, 247 App. Div. 823, 286 N.Y. Supp. 694 (1936).
179. See text at note 158 supra.
180. The Uniform Act does provide that a creditor, "when his claim has matured,"
may . . . "[d]isregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property
conveyed. . . ." N.M. Stat. Ann. §50-14-9 (1953). But this provision should no more be
construed to authorize attachment where no grounds therefore exist under the attachment statute than to authorize execution without judgment.
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as to hinder, delay or defraud . . . creditors."' 1 "Defraud" was dropped in
18 2
the 1929 revision.
If the fraudulent disposition under the third ground for attachment is read
to cover fraudulent conveyances and assignments, as previously suggested,'8 3
this fourth ground obviously covers the debtor who is about to do something
which if accomplished, would be covered by the third ground. And what was
said about the defendant who "is about to" remove his property from the state,
under the third ground of attachment, is equally applicable here. It will not do
to show that the action has already been taken, nor need it be shown that defendant intends to take action immediately.18 4 As our court has said, in holding that an allegation that defendant had "attempted fraudulently to convey"
was insufficient to charge that he was about to do so, the statute means "that
there must be present in the mind of the debtor a purpose of convey which he
is on the verge of executing" and an allegation of a past attempt "does not
state a present purpose to do something which is likely to be accomplished at
any moment." Rather, the allegation "related to a past transaction which . . .
may have been absolutely abandoned, and heartily repented of."' ' But the
Missouri courts have found the necessary imminent concealment or disposition
where the debtor confessed judgment for his brother-in-law, who stayed execution levy until plaintiff had delivered his attachment writ to the sheriff, 86 and
where the debtor had offered to pay another to set fire to his insured goods. s "
Here again, the word "fraudulently" imports an intent on the part of the
debtor to achieve the proscribed effect. s' Here again, the intent may be found
as a matter of law where the effect is clear enough. 8 9 But where the only appar181. Kearny Code, Attachments §1(4) (1846) at 1 N.M. Star. Ann, 303 (1953; Mo.
Rev. Stat. ch. 11,art. I, §1(7) (8) (1845) (now Mo. Ann Stat. §521.010(9), (10) (1953)).
182. See note 44 supra; N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1(IV) (1953). The deletion is probably of no significance. See Custis v. Settle, 7 Mo. 452 (1842).
183. See p. 323, supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 118-20, supra.
185. Meyer.& Sons v. Black, 4 N.M. 352 at 368-69,16 Pac. 620 at 627 (1888).
186. Field v. Liverman, 17 Mo. 218 (1852).
187. Wilson-Obear Groc. Co. v. Cole, 26 Mo. App. 5 (1887). And see Eby, Dowden
& Co. v. Watkins, 39 Mo. App. 27 (1890), suggesting that an unrecorded transfer which
would otherwise be a fraudulent conveyance as a matter of law, but which was "not a
conveyance" as to creditors protected by the recording act, was as against such creditors
and until recording, a fraudulent conveyance which the debtor was about to make.
188. An effect either of delaying or of otherwise hindering creditors will do. See
note 117 supra.
189. Here again, as in the case of the fraudulent conveyance (see text supra note
163), the Missouri courts have on occasion disregarded the statutory requirement that
the contemplated conveyance or concealment be "so as to hinder or delay" creditors and
have allowed attachment without regard to the amount of property which would be
left for creditors after the conveyance or concealment was accomplished. Taylor v.
Meyers, 34 Mo. 81 (1863) ; Weinstein v. Reid, 25 Mo. App. 41 (1887) ; Mathewson v.
Larson-Myers Co., 217 S.W. 609 (Mo. App. 1919).
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ent effect is to delay creditors, the delay must be unreasonable in order to

establish a fraudulent intent. The statute does not proscribe only such delay as
is incidental to an orderly liquidation of property by a contemplated assignment
for the benefit to creditors. 190
Fifth Ground: "When the debt was contracted out of this state, and the
debtor has absconded or secretly removed his property or effects into the state,
with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors."
This concern for the out-of-state creditor, which the Kearny draftsmen
took from Missouri without significant change, 191 seems logically to correlate
with the third ground for attachment, which reaches the New Mexico debtor
who is about to remove his property from this state or who has concealed his
property. But in more thai a century there is not instance in the reported cases
of the use of this ground for attachment in either New Mexico or Missouri.
Sixth Ground: "Where the defendant is a corporation whose principal office
or place of business is out of the state, unless such corporation shall have a
designated agent in this state, upon whom service of process may be made in
suits against the corporation."
The corporation was not in 1846 of sufficient importance to warrant this
separate treatment in either the Missouri law or the Kearny Code. In 1855
Missouri added: "Where the defendant is a corporation, whose chief office or
place of business is out of this state."' 192 New Mexico followed in 1874, substituting "principal office" for "chief office" and adding the qualification that
the corporation must have failed to designate an agent for service of process.' 93
The Missouri provision is construed as making the first ground for attachment-non-residence---inapplicable to corporations, and as authorizing attachment against all corporations, foreign and domestic, whose chief office or place
94
of business is out-of-state.
While it is essential to establish that the corporation's principal office or place
of business is outside the state, 195 it is no defense for the corporation in Missouri
190. Torlina v. Trorlicht, 5 N.M. 148, 21 Pac. 69 (1889). And see Belcher & Brown
Lumber & Mercantile Co. v. Drane, 107 Mo. App. 56, 80 S.W. 307 (1904). The necessary intent is not demonstrated by showing that the debtor is about to make a preferential
payment, Smith & Co. v. National Ry. Elec. & Industrial Exposition Ass'n, 47 Mo. App.
462 (1892).
191. Kearny Code Attachments §1(5) (1846) at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303 (1953)
(now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (IV) (1953)); Rev. Stat. Mo. ch. 11, art I §1(9) (1845)
(now Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010(11) (1953)).
192. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 12, art. I, §1(2) (1855)

(now Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.010(2)

(1953)).
193. N.M. Laws 1874, ch. 17, §1 at 38 (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (VI) (1953)).
194. Farnsworth v. Terre-Haute, Alton & St. Louis R. R., 29 Mo. 75 (1859).
195. Middough v. St. Joseph & Denver City R. R. Co., 51 Mo. 520 (1873). If the corporation has no principal office in this state, N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (4) (e) (3) (1953),
prescribing various methods of effecting service, apparently would be inapplicable.
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that, under statutes and rules relating to process, 196 it may nonetheless be effec197
tive served with summons in the state.
In New Mexico, however, it is also necessary for plaintiff to show that the
corporation has not "designated" an agent for service of process. Such designation is required by statute for foreign corporations generally as a part of the
procedure by which they qualify to do business in this state, 198 and for foreign
and domestic insurance companies as part of the licensing procedure. 199 And
if "designation" includes the naming of an agent for service of process required
in the certificate of incorporation for New Mexico corporations, 20 0 and required also for all foreign and domestic corporations doing business in the
state by the Corporate Reports Act of 1959,201 then all law-abiding domestic
corporations, as well as all law-abiding foreign corporations doing business here,
should be immune from attachment on this ground.
For the corporations that have not complied with the requirement that an
196. A special provision in our Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes service upon any
railroad company by serving "any station agent of any such company at any station or
depot, and if there are no stations or agents within the county, then service may be made
upon any conductor of a passenger or freight train of cars of such company." N.M.
Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(4) (e) (2) (1953). In addition, N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(4) (o) (1953),
authorizes service upon any domestic or foreign corporation by serving "an officer, a
managing or general agent, or . . . any other agent authorized by appointment or law
to receive service of process" if a copy is also mailed to the defendant.
With respect to foreign corporations only, N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-3-6(a) (1953), authorizes service upon any officer, director or agent personally, or by leaving a copy of
the process at his dwelling house or usual place of abode, or at "the office, depot or
usual place of business of such foreign corporation."
Constitutional questions arising from the application of these provisions to foreign
corporations are beyond the scope of this article. But see Caledonian Oil Co. v. Baker,
196 U.S. 432 (1905) ; State ex rel. Grinnell Co. v. McPherson, 62 N.M. 308, 309 P.2d 981,
982 (1957) ; Silva v. Crombie & Co., 39 N.M. 240, 44 P.2d 719 (1935) ; Kurland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and The In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569 (1958).
197. Wayne Mfg. Co. v. Challenge Co., 280 S.W. 448 (Mo. App. 1926).
198. N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-10-4 (1953). See also special provisions for foreign corporations contracting with the state, N.M. Stat. Ann. §6-6-14 (1953) ; for foreign building
and loan associations, N.M. Stat. Ann. §48-15-23 (1953) ; for Mexican casualty companies, N.M. Stat. Ann. §58-5-9(d) (1953), and for real estate brokers, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§67-24-31 (1953).
199. N.M. Stat. Ann. §58-5-8 (1953).
200. The certificate of incorporation must set forth "The location of [the corporation's] principal office in this state, and the name of the agent therein and in charge
thereof, upon whom process against the corporation may be served." N.M. Stat. Ann.
§51-2-8 (1953).
201. Each such corporation is to file an annual report with the State Corporation
Commission setting forth, among other things, "the location of its registered office in
this state and the name of the agent upon whom process against the corporation may
be served." N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-21-2 (1953). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-2-24 (1953).
The "registered office" referred to in this statute is apparently the same as the "principal
office in this state" referred to in note 200. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-2-37 (Supp. 1961).
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agent be designated, it presumably is no defense to attachment that the statutes
202
provide other means for serving them with summons.
One additional problem disposed of in Missouri suggests a related problem
here. The more specific provision of the attachment law was there held to limit
an earlier provision of the corporation law which on its face appeared to authorize attachment against any foreign corporation having property in the state. 20 .1
Our corporation law, adopted in 1905 long after enactment of the specific provision in the attachment law governing out-of-state corporations, contains
a section providing with more brevity than clarity that "Attachments may issue
against corporations not created or recognized as corporations and joint stock
associations of this state by the laws of this territory [state] and not having
qualified themselves to do business in this territory [state]." 20 4 The draftsmen of our corporation law, using the New Jersey corporation law as a model,2 0 5
apparently strayed into the New Jersey attachment law for this provision, but
mutilated it considerably in the transition. 206 It was settled in New Jersey at
this time that corporations not "created" by the state were foreign corporations,
and that a foreign corporation was not "recognized" by the law of New Jersey
20 7
unless it had qualified to do business there.
Since this section was adopted in New Mexico after the attachment statute,
it cannot easily be concluded that it is limited by the attachment statute. And
since a part of the procedure for qualifying to do business in the state is the
designation of an agent for service of process, 20 8 the corporation law may be
construed to authorize attachment against foreign corporations that have not
designated such agents even though their principal office or place of business is
within the state. Indeed, it may be construed to authorize attachment against
a foreign corporation which has designated an agent and does have its principal
202. Cf. Wayne Mfg. Co. v. Challenge Co., 280 S.W. 448 (Mo. App. 1926). And see
note 209 infra. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-3-6 (1953) authorizes service upon the Secretary of
State where a foreign corporation doing business in this state fails to designate an agent.
See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §§6-6-16, 21-3-7 through 21-3-11, 21-3-16, 58-5-47 (1953)
and the caveat about constitutional limitations in note 196. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-3-5
(1953), also authorizes service on the Secretary of State where a foreign or domestic
corporation fails to file the annual report naming an agent for service of process
as formerly required by N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-2-36 (1953). But §51-2-36 was repealed
by the Corporate Reports Act [N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 181, §10, at 491], with any change
being made in §21-3-5.
203. Farnsworth v. Terre-Haute, Alton & St. Louis R. R., 29 Mo. 75 (1859).
204. N.M. Laws 1905, ch. 79, §106, at 179 (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-10-8 (1953)).
205. See Jones v. Page, 26 N.M. 440, 447, 194 Pac. 883, 886 (1920) ; State v. Bank of
Magdalena, 33 N.M. 473,477, 270 Pac. 881, 883 (1928) ; State v. State Bank, 38 N.M. 338,
342, 32 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1934).
206. "Attachments may issue against . . . corporations not created or recognized as
corporations of this state by the laws of this state and joint stock associations." N.J. Laws

1901, ch. 74, §1 (4).

207. Goldmark v. Magnolia Metal Co., 65 N.J.L. 341, 47 At. 720 (1900) ; Phillipsburgh Bank v. Lackawanna R. R. Co., 27 N.J.L. 206 (1858). See also Brand v. Auto
Serv. Co., 75 N.J.L. 230, 67 At. 19 (1907).
208. N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-10-4 (1953).
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office or place of business in the state, but has otherwise failed to qualify here.
The position of the foreign joint stock association is even more uncertain.
The forms of business organization which may qualify to do business as building
and loan associations, insurance companies, Mexican casualty companies and
real estate brokers are broadly enough defined to include joint stock companies.210 But the general qualification statute is by its terms confined to corporations, 211 from which it might be concluded either that the foreign joint stock
company need not or that it cannot qualify to do other types of business here.
All things considered, we might be well advised to follow the New Jersey
example further. That state in 1951 dropped the provision for attachment
212
of corporations "not created or recognized" and joint stock associations.
Seventh Ground: "Where the defendant fraudulently contracted the debt
or incurred the obligation respecting which the suit is brought or obtained
credit from the plaintiff by false pretenses."
Missouri adopted its more simple provision in 1885: "Where the debt sued
for was fradulently contracted on the part of the debtor. ' 213 Our provision
was added in 1874,214 and has not yet been construed by our Supreme Court.
Since our provision is not confined to "debts contracted," but extends also
to "obligations incurred," there is no need to exclude, as the Missouri courts
have done, an action for fraudulent conversion of property, 215 or a purchaser's
action to rescind a sale fraudulently induced and to recover the purchase price. 216
And even in Missouri the seller who has been induced by fraud to part with his
goods can waive the fraud and sue for the price, and yet assert the fraud as a
217
ground for attachment.
The Missouri courts have allowed juries to find fraud not only where the
creditor relies upon the debtor's misrepresentation of his financial condition
209. In New Jersey, the fact that another statute, which apparently constituted the
model for N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-3-6(a) (1953), authorizes a feasible method for serving
summons on the foreign corporation was held not to preclude attachment on the ground
that the corporation had not qualified to do business in the state. Goldmark v. Magnolia
Metal Co., 65 N.J.L. 341,47 At. 720 (1900).
210. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§48-15-22, 48-15-23, 58-1-1, 58-5-8, 58-5-9, 67-24-20, 67-24-31

(1953).
211. N.M. Stat. Ann. §51-10-4 (1953).
212. N.J. Rev. Stat. §2A26-2 (1952).

213. Gen. Stat. Mo. (1866), ch. 141, §I(XIV) (now Mo. Ann. Stat. 521.010(14)
(1953)).
214. N.M. Laws 1874, ch. 17 §1, (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1 (VII) (1953)).
215. Finlay v. Bryson, 84 Mo. 664 (1884). But the conversion must be accomplished

by fraud. Simple misappropriation or embezzlement will not come within the statute.
Finlay v. Bryson, supra; Rohan Bros. Boiler Mfg. Co. v. Latimore, 18 Mo. App. 16

(1885) ; Sunday Mirror Co. v. Galvin, 55 Mo. App. 412 (1893).
216. Ryles, Wilson & Co. v. Shelley Mfg. Co., 93 Mo. App. 178 (1902) ; Steele v.
Brazier, 139 Mo. App. 319, 123 S.W. 477 (1909).

217. Blackwell v. Fry, 49 Mo. App. 638 (1892); Mapes v. Burns, 72 Mo. App. 411
(1897) ; Kansas City Stained Glass Works & Sign Co. v. Robertson, 73 Mo. App. 154
(1898). See also Alexander v. Wade, 107 Mo. App. 321, 80 S.W. 917 (1904). Cf. Finlay
v. Bryson, 84 Mo. 664 (1884).
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directly 218 or through a credit agency, 219 but also where the jury was persuaded
that the debtor intended not to pay for goods when he bought them and concealed his unworthy intention from the seller. 220 But they have not agreed on
the question whether the purchaser of goods who promises to write a check
for them as soon as he gets home, knowing that he has no bank account, has incurred a debt for the purchase price by fraudulent misrepresentation. 221
One limitation clearly applicable in Missouri is probably also applicable here.
Under the Missouri statute the debt fraudulently incurred must be the "debt
sued for." Plaintiff cannot sue on one claim and attach on the ground that another claim was fraudulently incurred; nor can he join the two and attach for
both. Unless he has some additional ground, the attachment must be limited
to the claim fraudulently incurred. 222 The same limitation is clearly incorporated in so much of our statute as refers to the fraudulent contracting of the
debt or incurring of the obligation "respecting which the suit is brought,"
but is not so clearly applicable to the disjunctive phrase "or obtained credit from
the plaintiff by false pretenses."
One difficulty with the disjunctive phrase is that of assigning any meaning
to it not already covered by the concept of a "fraudulently . ..incurred .. .
obligation" covered by the preceding phrase. "False pretense" is not, in the
law of tort, a concept apart from "fraud," but merely one way of committing
fraud. 223 The crime of obtaining money or property by false pretenses has been
recognized in the criminal law for more than 170 years 224 and in New Mexico
since the Kearny Code. 225 But in the original 226 and all New Mexican 22T defi218. Eisenhardt v. Cabanne, 16 Mo. App. 531 (1885) ; Ring v. Chas. Vogel Paint &
Glass Co., 44 Mo. App. 111 (1891) ; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Jenkins, 47 Mo. App. 664 (1892).
219. Gries v. Blackman, 30 Mo. App. 2 (1888); Tootle, Hosea & Co. v. John J.
Lysaght & Co., 65 Mo. App. 139 (1896).
220. Cole Mfg. Co. v. Jenkins, 47 Mo. App. 664 (1892) ; Blackwell v. Fry, 49 Mo.
App. 638 (1892). See also Telman v. Galles, 41 N.M. 56, 63 P.2d 1049 (1936) (not an
attachment case).
221. Matthews v. Eby, 149 Mo. App. 157, 129 S.W. 1016 (1910); Matthews v. Eby,
168 Mo. App. 134, 151 S.W. 470 (1912). And see State v. Tanner, 22 N.M. 493, 164 Pac.
882 (1917) (not an attachment case). Cf. State v. Davisi 26 N.M. 523, 194 Pac. 882
(1921) (not an attachment case) ; State v. Thompson, 37 N.M. 229, 20 P.2d 1030 (1933)
(not an attachment case) ; State v. Gilmore, 47 N.M. 59, 134 P.2d 541 (1943) appeal
dismissed 320 U.S. 710 (1943) (not an attachment case).
222. Third Nat'l Bank v. Cramer, 78 Mo. App. 476 (1899). But a running account
has been treated as a single debt, so that if any part of it was incurred by fraud plaintiff can attach for the entire amount. Mackey v. Hyatt, 42 Mo. App. 443 (1890).
223. Modern writers on torts eschew the word "fraud" as too vague and speak instead of actionable misrepresentation, a concept broader than the early common law
action for deceit. See Harper & James, Torts, ch. VII (1956) ; Prosser, Torts, ch. 18
(2d ed., 1955).
224. See Hall, Theft, Law and Society, ch. 18 (2d ed., 1955).
225. Kearny Code, Crimes and Punishments, art. II, §3 (1846) ; N.M. Laws 1853-54,
§30 at 106; (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-21-1 (1953)). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. -§40-21-3
(1953).
226. 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24 (1757).
227. Note 225, supra.
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nitions, "intent to defraud" is an essential element of the crime. While the
"false pretense" may be manifested by conduct as well as by express statements, 229 it must result in defendant obtaining money or property from the
plaintiff. 230 Embezzlement of property obtained from defendant without fraud
s
will not do.2 1
If, therefore, the attachment law incorporates the criminal law concept of
false pretense, defendant can "obtain credit from the plaintiff by false pretenses"
so as to render himself subject to attachment, without at the same time violating
the criminal law, only if he somehow obtains credit from plaintiff without obtaining from him "any money or goods, wares, merchandise or other property,
or any service or other thing of value." 23 2 But, whether or not he obtains money,
property, service or other thing of value, he appears to have "fraudulently . . .
incurred [an] obligation" under the first alternative in this ground for attachment, so that the second alternative is superfluous.
If the court is not to read all meaning out of the second alternative, therefore,
it apparently must construe it to mean (a) that no intent to defraud is required,
and plaintiff can attach where defendant obtained credit by negligent, or perhaps by any, misrepresentations, and/or (b) that a defendant who obtains
credit from plaintiff by fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to attachment
on any claim which plaintiff has against him. With these choices, the preferable
conclusion seems to be to read the second alternative as meaningless surplusage.
Eighth and Ninth Grounds: "That the debt is for work and labor, or for any
services rendered by the plaintiff, or his assignor, at the instance of the
defendant."
"Where the debt was contracted for the necessities of life."
These provisions which have no counterparts in Missouri, were added to
our attachment law in 1929.233 They have not been construed by our Supreme
Court, but obviously reflect the same compassion for wage and salary claimants
and suppliers of necessities as is manifested also by exceptions in various exemption laws.2 4 The claim for "necessities of life" probably extends to necessities
furnished to any of the debtor's family or dependents for whose support he is
228. State v. Ferguson, 56 N.M. 398, 244 P.2d 783 (1952).
229. State v. Kelly, 27 N.M. 412, 202 Pac. 524 (1921) ; State v. Garcia, 57 N.M. 166,
256 P.2d. 532 (1953).
230. Territory v. Hubbell, 13 N.M. 579, 86 Pac. 747 (1906) ; State v. Faggard, 25
N.M. 76, 177 Pac. 748 (1918).
231. See State v. Seefeldt, 54 N.M. 24, 212 P.2d 1053 (1949). Cf. note 215, supra.
232. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-21-1 (Supp. 1961). "Any service or other thing of value"
was added by N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 113, §1, at 294.
233. N.M. Laws 1929, ch. 217, §1, at 289, (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-1(VIII)-(IX)
(1953)).
234. N.M. Stat. Ann. §24-5-1 (1953) ("debts incurred for manual labor") ; N.M.
Stat. Ann. §24-6-1 (Supp. 1961) ("lien of a . . . laborer") ; N.M. Stat. Ann. §59-9-18(c)
(1953) ("necessaries furnished to such individual or his spouse or dependents").
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responsible, as is made explicit in some of the exemption laws. And the claim
for "work and labor, or for any services rendered" probably includes more than
the "labor" claims favored by the exemption laws. It apparently may include the
salary of an executive and the fees of a professional man, and may be enforced
by attachment at the instance of the original claimant or of his assignee.
IV.

OBTAINING THE WRIT

A. The Attachment Affidavit: The plaintiff seeking to begin his suit by attachment must file not only his complaint but also an attachment affidavit and
bond.23 5 The affidavit has been required to allege, since the Kearny draftsmen
copied the Missouri language, "that the defendant is justly indebted to the
plaintiff, after allowing all just credits and offsets," in a sum to be specified in
the affidavit, "and on what account," and must also allege that the affiant "has
good reason to believe, and does believe, the existence of one or more" of the
grounds for attachment.236 The affidavit may be made "by the plaintiff, or
some person for him."2 3 7 In 1855 we added a statutory form of affidavit which
prescribes the method of alleging indebtedness, ignores the earlier requirement
of an allegation "on what account," and leaves the allegation of grounds for
238
attachment to the ingenuity of plaintiff's counsel.
In the absence of any express statutory authority for amendment of the affidavit, our court has on occasion construed statutory requirements strictly,
235. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-4 (1953). N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-10 (1953) requires the
affidavit and bond to be filed before the writ is issued. Waldo v. Beckwith, 1 N.M. 97
(1854), holds an attachment writ issued before the filing of the affidavit and bond a
nullity which should be quashed. N.M. Stat. Ann. §16-3-49 (1953) authorizing "all . . .
matters" to be "performed nunc pro tunc when the ends of justice may require it," was
held in the Waldo case not to authorize the court to permit retroactive filing of affidavit
and bond. Accord, Stevenson & Hord v. Robbins, 5 Mo. 18 (1837), where the affidavit
was filed before and the bond after the writ was issued.
236. Kearny Code, Attachments §3 (1846) at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303 (1953) ; (now
N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-5 (1953)). The grounds alleged need not necessarily be consistent.
See First Nat'l Bank v. George, 26 N.M. 176, 190 Pac. 1026 (1920) ; Field & Beardslee
v. Liverman, 17 Mo. 218 (1852); Tucker v. Frederick, 28 Mo. 574 (1859).
237. Kearny Code, Attachments §3 (1846) at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303 (1953) (now N.M.
Stat. Ann. §26-1-6 (1953)) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §3 (1845). The corresponding
provision for justice courts is N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-7-2 (1953). The Missouri language
has now been slightly revised. Mo. Stat. Ann. §521.060 (1953).
Where the affidavit is made by an agent, it should disclose the fact of agency but
need not disclose the agent's means of knowledge. Irwin v. Evans, 92 Mo. 472, 4 S.W.
693 (887) ; Gilkeson v. Knight, 71 Mo. 403 (1880) ; Claflin v. Hoover, 20 Mo. App.
314 (1886); Mackey v. Hyatt, 42 Mo. App. 443 (1890) ; Kirksville Savings Bank v.
Spangler, 59 Mo. App. 172 (1894) ; Bauer Grocery Co. v. Smith, 61 Mo. App. 665 (1895).
See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-6 (1953). Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-11-1 (1953).
238. N.M. Laws 1854-55, §3, at 77 (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-6 (1953)). A similar
form for justice courts is prescribed by N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-11-1 (1953). Missouri, instead, adopted a provision that allegations of statutory grounds in the statutory language
will be sufficient. Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.030 (1953).
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quashing a writ issued in a suit brought by a partnership because the affidavit
was made in behalf of the firm without naming the partners, although they were
named in the complaint, 239 and refusing to allow a plaintiff whose affidavit
alleged a fraudulent conveyance of partnership property to prove a fraudulent
conveyance of the individual property of the partners although they had appeared in the suit against the firm and their individual property would be subject to the judgment. 240 But an intervening decision disapproves the first holding and sustains an affidavit which was sworn to before a notary public instead
of the clerk of the court as prescribed in the statutory form, 241 and which departed from the statute in not prefacing the allegation of statutory grounds
with a recital that the affiant "has good reason to believe and does believe" in
their existence.2 42 The court also pointed out that if the affidavit was to be
treated as a pleading, as the earlier decision treated it, liberal statutory provisions for amendment comparable to present Rule 15243 were available.
In the 1907 revision of the attachment act, provision for amendment was made
in terms which may be more restrictive than in the case of other pleadings:
"where an original writ of attachment . .. has been quashed for defect in
the affidavit, bond or writ, the court shall allow an amendment thereof to cure
the defect, under such circumstances as amendments of ordinary pleadings are
allowed by law and with like effect." The issuance of alias and pluries writs,
upon new affidavit and bond, was also.authorized "where a prior writ has been
12 44
quashed for defect that cannot be cured by amendment.
Since this provision seems to contemplate amendments only after the writ has
been quashed, and to contemplate some noncurable defects, it might have been
wiser to follow a Missouri provision that no attachment shall be dissolved for
239. Bennett v. Zabriski, 2 N.M. 7 (1880), on rehearing 2 N.M. 176 (1881). Cf. N.M.
Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (10) (a) (1953).
240. First Nat'l Bank v. Lesser & Lewinson, 10 N.M. 700, 65 Pac. 179 (1901).
241. Robinson v. Hesser 4 N.M. 282, 13 Pac. 204 (1887). The court relied upon N.M.
Stat. Ann. §43-1-3 (1953), authorizing notaries public to administer oaths in all cases
where officers may do so. The Missouri courts, whose statute is silent as to who shall
administer the oath, have accepted affidavits made before oath-taking authorities in
other states. Hays v. Bouthalier, 1 Mo. 346 (1823) ; Posey v. Buckner, 3 Mo. 604 (1834).
And see Avery v. Good, 114 Mo. 290, 21 S.W. 815 (1892).
242. See Stevenson & Hord v. Robbins, 5 Mo. 18 (1837), holding insufficient an affidavit alleging affiant's belief but failing to allege he had good reason to believe. Cf.
Massey v. Scott, 49 Mo. 278 (1872). Cf. also Livengood v. Shaw, 10 Mo. 273 (1847),
sustaining an affidavit alleging that defendant was "indebted," rather than "justly indebted," to plaintiff. In any event, the statute does not require that plaintiff allege
grounds for attachment as a matter of fact-an allegation that plaintiff believes and has
good reason to believe that a designated ground exists is sufficient. Audenreid v. Hull,
45 Mo. App. 202 (1891).
243. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(15) (1953). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §§21-4-16 through
21-4-18 (1933).
244. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107 §1 (227), at 280 (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-14 (1953)).
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insufficiency "if the plaintiff shall file a good and sufficient affidavit, to be
2 4'
approved by the court, in such time and manner as the court shall direct." .
Under this provision the Missouri courts have refused to quash the writ and
have allowed plaintiff to file an amendent affidavit "almost without limit," 246
even after appeal from justice to circuit court where the case is tried de novo, 247
drawing the line and quashing the writ only where plaintiff fails to execute the
original affidavit upon which the writ was issued.2 48 And, where the case proceeds to judgment and execution sale without challenge to the attachment affidavit, they have held in subsequent litigation between the defendant and the
plaintiff or execution purchaser that an attachment proceeding based upon an
24
affidavit which could have been amended is not subject to collateral attackY.
C
The Missouri courts have also held that a single affidavit may serve as the
attachment affidavit and as the affidavit required by the statute authorizing
service by publication, 250 where the attachment is on grounds which entitled
plaintiff to proceed on constructive service. 251 The same result is contemplated
by our attachment statute, which contains its own provision for service by publi245. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §47 (1845),

(now Mo. Ann Stat. §521.480(1)

(1953)).
246. Mauer v. Phillips, 182 Mo. App. 440, 447, 168 S.W. 669, 671 (1914). See also
Hackney v. Williams, 3 Mo. 455 (1834) ; Henderson v. Drace, 30 Mo. 358 (1860);
State ex rel. Rabiste v. Southern, 300 Mo. 417, 254 S.W. 166 (1923) ; Claflin v. Hoover,
20 Mo. App. 314 (1886) ; Mackey v. Hyatt, 42 Mo. App. 443 (1890) ; Kirksville Says.
Bank v. Spangler, 59 Mo. App. 172 (1894) ; Shelton v. Smith, 214 Mo. App. 519, 257
S.W. 509 (1924).
247. Musgrove v. Mott, 90 Mo. 107, 2 S.W. 214 (1886). See also Marshall v. Brown,
145 Mo. App. 426, 122 S.W. 790 (1909). On appeal from our justice courts to the district courts the case is also tried de noejo. N.M. Const. art. VI, §27; N.M. Stat. Ann.
§36-18-6 (1953). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-18-15 (1953).
248. Third Nat'l Bank v. Garton, 40 Mo. App. 113 (1890). See also Hargadine v.
Van Horn, 72 Mo. 370 (1880) ; Burnett v. McCluey, 78 Mo. 676 (1883). Cf. Marshall
v. Brown, supra note 247. The same rule is applied where an affidavit is executed in the
name of a partnership or a corporation which cannot take a corporal oath, rather than
by an agent who can, Norman v. Horn, 36 Mo. App. 419 (1889) ; Farmers' State Bank
v. Gibson, 278 S.W. 737 (Mo. App., 1926) ; or where the clerk of the court is plaintiff and
his oath is taken by his deputy. Owens v. Johns, 59 Mo. 89 (1875). But where plaintiff
filed a new and properly executed affidavit before the first writ was served, and procured issuance and service of a second writ thereon, the case was treated as one of
valid ancillary attachment. First Nat'l Bank v. Griffith, 192 Mo. App. 443, 182 S.W. 805
(1916).
249. Burnett v. McCluey, 92 Mo. 230, 4 S.W. 694 (1887) ; Avery v. Good, 114 Mo.
290, 21 S.W. 815 (1893). See also Gilkeson v. Knight, 71 Mo. 403 (1880). Here also,
there must have been at least an executed affidavit. Hargadine v. Van Horn, supra
note 248; Burnett v. McCluey, supra note 248; Norman v. Horn, supra note 248.
250. Mo. Ann. Stat. §506.160 (1953). The inscrutable reference in the Missouri attachment statute to service by publication "as directed," Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.380 (1953),
is traceable to a time when the attachment statute contained its own provisions for service
by publication. See Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 12, art. I, §§23, 24, 43 (1855).
251. Bray v. Marshall, 75 Mo. 327 (1882) ; Burnett v. McCluey, 78 Mo.676 (1883)
Avery v. Good, 114 Mo. 290, 21 S.W. 815 (1893).
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cation whenever it appears "from the affidavit for attachment and the return
' 252
of the sheriff, that . . . defendant cannot be personally served with process."
B. The Attachment Bond: The second prerequisite to issuance of an attachment writ, the filing of an attachment bond with the clerk,2 58 closely follows the
Missouri model. 254 As the requirements now read, the bond must be executed
by plaintiff or some responsible person as principal, and by two or more sureties,
residents of the state, or by some bonding company authorized to do business
in the state. If individual sureties are used, the assets of each in excess of debts
must be worth the penalty of the bond, which must be at least double the amount
sworn to in the attachment affidavit unless the court fixes a lesser amount. The
condition of the bond is that plaintiff will prosecute his action without delay
and with effect, 255 and upon breach thereof will pay all damages resulting to
defendant. 250 In 1855 a statutory form of bond was enacted 257 which, as later
252. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-18 (1953).
253. See note 235 supra. The bond need not be dated. It takes effect when filed with
the clerk. Claflin v. Hoover, 20 Mo. App. 314 (1886).
254. Kearny Code, Attachments §4 (1846), at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 303 (1953) (now
N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-7 (1953)) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §4 (1845). The Kearny
draftsmen increased the number of sureties from "one or more" to "two or more" and
eliminated the requirement that they be "householders." Whether they thereby made
corporations, partnerships and other forms of business associations eligible as sureties
has not been determined. Cf. Steppacher, Arnold & Co. v. McClure, 75 Mo. App. 135
(1898).
255. The meaning of the condition and the consequences of its breach are examined
more fully under The Rules of Attachment-Financial Liability, part II, to appear in the
next issue of the Journal.
256. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-7 (1953). The original requirement that individual
sureties be residents of the county in which the suit was brought was eliminated in 1874.
N.M. Laws 1874, ch. 18, §1, at 39. The 1907 revision added the alternative use of a
bonding company instead of individual sureties. N.M. Laws 1907 ch. 107, §1(186), at
271. Authority in the court to reduce the penalty of the bond was first added in 1913,
restricted to cases where levy was to be limited to realty, N.M. Laws 1913, ch. 56 §1 (186),
at 72, and extended to all cases in 1939. N.M. Laws 1939, ch. 159, §2, at 344. The same
1939 amendment added the requirement as to the net worth of individual sureties. The
1913 amendment made the bond payable to the defendant rather than to the state, but
did not repeal N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-11 (1953), requiring suits on the bond to be maintained "by any party injured in the name of the state." Under N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-7-2
(1953) the bond in justice court must still have two or more "sufficient securities," although there is no express requirement as to their residence or net worth, and the court
is given no authority to reduce the penalty of the bond.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-9 (1953) enacted by N.M. Laws 1874, ch. 18, §2, at 39, and
revised by N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107, §1 (187), at 271, requires the sureties to acknowledge
their execution of the bond "in the manner and before such officer as may be prescribed
by law for the acknowledgment of conveyances of real estate." N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-4
(1953) lists the officers who may take acknowledgments of any written instrument, and
§43-1-9 prescribes forms of acknowledgment for written instruments affecting real estate.
While acknowledgment of a real estate conveyance is by §71-1-3, as amended by N.M.
Laws 1961, ch. 96, §11-118, at 423, a necessary prerequisite to recording, McBee v.
O'Connell, 16 N.M. 469, 120 Pac. 734 (1911), acknowledgment has not since 1901 been
otherwise essential to the validity of the conveyance. Garcia v. Leal, 30 N.M. 249, 231
Pac. 631 (1924).
257. N.M. Laws 1854-55 §4, at 79.
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revised,2 5 8 prescribes a form for use with two individual sureties.259 Plaintiffs
using a bonding company as surety must revise the form slightly and must pay
2 60
a fee of $10 per $1000 of the penalty of the bond.
The clerk of the court is to "judge the sufficiency of the penalty and the secu:
ity in the bond." At the time this provision was taken from Missouri, 261 this
function with respect to the penalty consisted only of ascertaining that it was
double the amount sworn to in the attachment affidavit. In a case where the
court exercises later-granted authority to reduce the penalty,28 2 the clerk's role
would be to ascertain that the penalty corresponds with the amount so fixed.
The clerk's function with respect to the sufficiency of security is more substantial. If individual sureties are used, he must ascertain that each of them is
a resident of the state and has assets in excess of debts equal to the penalty of
the bond. If a bonding company is the surety, the clerk must ascertain that it
is authorized to do business in this state. 2 8 And he gets no assistance from the
258. N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 107, §1(208), at 276, N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-8 (1953). The
1907 revision, reflecting the 1897 elimination of return days on summons (note 77 supra),
eliminated a recital in the bond that the attachment was returnable to the next term of
court. The compilers of N.M. Code §4318 (1915), took account of the 1913 amendment
(note 256 supra) making the bond payable to defendant rather than the state.
259. A slightly different form of bond for justice courts, payable to the state, is prescribed by N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-11-1 (1953).
260. This is the rate per annum, with an annual minimum of $10, for fixed penalty
attachment bonds listed in the Rate Manual of Fidelity, Forgery and Surety Bonds
of the Surety Association of America, whose rates are filed with the Superintendent
of Insurance, in accordance with N.M. Stat. Ann. §§58-10-1 through 58-10-34 (1953),
on behalf of more than eighty bonding companies. Some forty-seven other companies
have filed independently, but, for the most part have filed the same rates. Letter of
April 20, 1961, from Vincent J. Basso, Rate Analyst, State of New Mexico, Department
of Insurance. I am advised, however, that some bonding companies under some circumstances will deviate from the Manual rates.
261. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §5 (1845) ; Kearny Code, Attachments §5 (1846),
at I N.M. Stat. Ann. 303-04 (1953) (now N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-10 (1953)).
262. See note 256 supra.
263. The clerks of Chaves, Curry, Eddy, McKinley and Quay Counties indicate that
they check the tax rolls to determine whether individual sureties have realty of a value
equal to the penalty of the bond. The clerks of Luna and Union Counties "check records"
and the clerk of Lincoln County checks "property valuation" and "title." The clerk of
Bernalillo County answered "no" to the question about what information is required
in passing on an individual surety and the clerk of San Miguel County indicated that
all sureties are approved by the court. Where a bonding company is surety, the clerk
of Lincoln County satisfies himself of "proper amount and proper signatures," the clerk
of Bernalillo County determines that it is a "reputable bonding company," the clerk of
Luna County relies upon a statement on the bond that the company is licensed to do
business in New Mexico, the clerk of McKinley County checks "to make sure that bond
is properly executed by an officer of the company and signed by the resident agent,"
the clerk of Curry County determines that the company is authorized to do business in
the state, the clerk of Chavez County requires a copy of the resident agent's power of
attorney be attached to the bond, and the clerks of Eddy, Quay and Union Counties
require no information. See note 9, supra.
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statutory form of bond, which contains no recitals as to the qualifications of
sureties.

264

If the clerk approves the bond he is to "endorse his approval thereon, '

2 5

but

his failure to do so is not fatal. The fact that he accepts and files the bond and

issues the attachment writ is treated as sufficient evidence of his approval. 266
The clerk's determination as to the sufficiency of the bond is, in any event,
not final. At any time before judgment defendant may move for additional security and if the court is satisfied "that any surety on such bond has removed

from the state, or that for any other reason such bond is not sufficient security
for the amount thereof," it may require a new bond to be filed within a reasonable time, and if plaintiff fails to do so may make such order for disposition
of the attached property "as the failure to give such additional security may

require.!

26 7

This provision, added in 1907,268 differs from an earlier Missouri

provision 2 6 9 in several details but in general seems to have the same effect.
Unless there is a significant difference between the court's power to inquire

whether the bond is "sufficient security for the amount thereof" under our statute
and whether the bond is "insufficient" under the Missouri statute, this provision, which is apparently designed for the protection of the defendant, may be
construed here as in Missouri to aid the plaintiff. There, defendants who have
sought to have the attachment writ quashed because of a variety of defects in
the bond have been told that they should, instead, invoke the statutory provi270
sion for remedying the insufficiency of the bond.
264. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§26-1-8, 36-11-1 (1953). Cf. the garnishment statute which
authorizes the clerk to require the affidavits of the "securities." N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-2-6
(1953). The clerk should not in any event be liable if one qualified surety remains solvent and able to respond to judgment on the bond. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Dunn,
60 Mo. 64 (1875).
265. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-10 (1953). The problem of the court clerk who is also
plaintiff in the attachment suit arose once in Missouri in Owens v. Johns, 59 Mo. 89
(1875) where the clerk-plaintiff had his deputy take his oath on the affidavit and approve
the bond. The court held the affidavit void and did not rule upon the validity of the bond.
Others may administer the oath for the affidavit (see note 241 supra), but, save for
deputy or assistant clerks (see N.M. Stat. Ann. §16-3-35 (1953)), the statutes provide no
alternate who may approve the bond.
266. Baca v. Coury, 27 N.M. 611, 204 Pac. 57 (1922) ; Whitman Agricultural Ass'n
v. Nat'l Ry., Elec. & Industrial Ass'n, 45 Mo. App. 90 (1891) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Griffith,
40 Mo. App. 113 (1890).
267. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-12 (1953).
268. N.M. Laws 1907 ch. 107, §1 (221), at 278-79.
269. Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 11, art. I, §§6, 7 (1845) ; (now Mo. Ann. Stat. §§521.090,
521.100 (1953)).
270. Van Arsdale v. Krum, 9 Mo. 397 (1845) (condition not in statutory form);
Tevis v. Hughes, 10 Mo. 380 (1847) (no sureties) ; Wood v. Squires, 28 Mo. 528 (1859)
(defective execution by principal) ; Beardslee v. Morgan, 29 Mo. 471 (1860) (no execution by principal) ; Henderson v. Drace, 30 Mo. 358 (1860) (bond not under seal) ; Jasper County v. Chenaut, 38 Mo. 357 (1866) (no sureties) ; R. L. McDonald Co. v. E. Fist &
Co., 53 Mo. 343 (1873) (defective execution by principal) ; Whitman Agricultural Ass'n
v. Nat'l Ry., Elec. & Industrial Ass'n, 45 Mo. App. 90 (1891) (no execution by principal).
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Our statutes also contain provision for relief of the surety on the bond.
Whenever he has "reason to believe himself in danger" he may apply to the
court to be relieved from the bond. But such relief may not be granted until
"a new bond shall have been given and approved. 12 7 1
C. Ancillary Attachment: "In any civil suit, when the summons against the defendant has been returned, executed," plaintiff may at any time before judgment,
272
and the suit
by filing an attachment affidavit and bond, get an ancillary writ
273
is thereafter to proceed as if commenced by attachment.
These provisions, added in 1860,274 follow the Missouri law in referring to
"any civil suit" 27 5-a phrase which, as used in the Missouri statute relating
to actions commenced by attachment, was later construed there to exclude
equitable actions.27 6 We do not follow Missouri in authorizing ancillary attachment in any suit."commenced by summons. ' 27 7 But the difference does not
appear material. In any case where the summons cannot be served, plaintiff
may still file an affidavit and bond and treat the suit as one commenced by
attachment. The applicable statutes 278 do not require that affidavit and bond
accompany the complaint, but only that they be filed before the writ issues.
In any event, by delayed application for the writ or by timely application
for an ancillary writ, plaintiff can take advantage of grounds for attachment
27 0
not discovered or not coming into existence until after the complaint was filed.
D. Issuance of the Writ: Since the Kearny Code our statute has provided that
attachment writs "shall be issued . . . in like mannare as an ordinary writ of
summons."' 280 This means in most judicial districts that the writ must be signed
See also Englehart-Davidson Mercantile Co. v. Burrell Sisters, 66 Mo. App. 117 (1896),
holding that it is too late to challenge the sufficiency of the bond in a motion for new
trial after judgment for plaintiff on the issues raised by defendant's denial of allegations of the attachment affdavit.
271. N.M. Stat. Ann. §28-1-i7 (1953).
272. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-43 (1953).
273. N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-44 (1953).

,274. N.M. Laws 1860, p. 16. Although this provision is codified with provisions applicable to district courts, it may apply also in justice courts. Cf. Butler Paper Co. v.
Sydney, 47 N.M. 463, 144 P.2d 170 (1943).
275. In Missouri the reference is to "any civil action." Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 12, art. 1,
§13 (1856) (now Mo. Ann. Stat. §521.130 (1953)).
276. Gage v. Gates, 62 Mo. 412 (1876) ;State ex rel. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath,
Inc. v. Harris, 349 Mo. 190, 159 S.W. 2d 799 (1942), and cases cited therein.
277. The dictum statement in Southern California Fruit Exch. v. Stamm, 9 N.M. 361,
368-369, 54 Pac. 345, 347 (1898), that, "An ancillary attachment is a proceeding in aid
of the personal action, when the debtor has been served or has appeared" is broader
than the statute. (Emphasis added.)
278. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§26-1-4, 26-1-10 (1953).
279. See Kirgman & Co. v. Cornell-Tebbetts Mach. & Buggy Co., 150 Mo. 282, 51
S.W. 727 (1899) ; California Fruit Exch. v. Stamm, 9 N.M. 361, 369, 54 Pac. 345, 347
(1898).

280. Kearny Code, Attachments, §8 (1846)
N.M. Stat. Ann. §26-1-15 (1953)).

at 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 304 (1953)

(now

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(VOL. I

2s

by the clerk and issued under the seal of the court. ' But in the first, second,
third, fifth and eleventh districts, which have more than one judge, the statutes
now require that all process be under the teste of the presiding judge. 28 2 (Notwithstanding which the clerks of Bernalillo County in the Second District,
Lincoln and Dona Ana Counties in the Third District, Chaves County in the
Fifth District and McKinley County in the Eleventh District indicate that
they still sign attachment writs.)
In two instances the issuance of a writ is forbidden: where defendant has
made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, unless and until the assignment has been declared void ab initio,28 3 and while delinquency proceedings are
284
pending against an insurance company debtor.
(PartII of this articlewill appearin the next issue of the JOURNAL.)
281. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (4) (b) (1953). Cf. Kearny Code, Practice at Law in
Civil Suits, §2 (1846) at I N.M. Stat. Ann. 341 (1953). In justice courts, the writ is to
be signed by the justice. N.M. Stat. Ann. §36-4-1 (1953). See also §§36-7-3, 36-11-1.
Cf. Kearny Code, Courts and Judicial Powers, §26 (1846) at I N.M. Stat. Ann. 314
(1953). A writ of execution signed by the sheriff is void and if he levies thereunder he
has no protection against an action of replevin or for damages. Munis v. Herrerra,
1 N.M. 362 (1862). In Missouri the omission of the court's seal on the attachment writ
can be corrected after defendant has filed a motion to quash the writ. Jump v. McClurg,
35 Mo. 193 (1864). But a writ which the clerk has neglected to sign is subject to a
motion to quash, at least where plaintiff makes no attempt to correct the omission by
amendment. Smith, Heddins & Co. v. Hackley, 44 Mo. App. 614 (1891).
282. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§16-3-3.3, 16-3-6, 16-3-6.4, 16-3-10.1, 16-2-10.2 (Supp. 1961).
In §§16-3-6 and 16-3-10.2 the requirement is that process be under the presiding judge's
"witness" rather than "teste."
283. N.M. Stat. Ann. §27-1-46 (1953). See Schofield v. Folsom, 7 N.M. 601, 38 Pac.
261 (1894), appeal dismissed 168 U.S. 7,06 (1897), and Saint v. Folsom, 8 N.M. 650,
46 Pac. 1117 (1896), where writs were quashed because issued after the assignment was
made, and Lyndonville Nat'l Bank v. Folsom, 7 N.M. 611, 38 Pac. 253 (1894), where
the writ was sustained because an earlier attempted assignment was ineffective to transfer title to the assignee. Schofield v. Folsom, supra, indicates that the procedure for
having the assignment declared void ab initio is a separate creditor's action under N.M.
Stat. Ann. §27-1-46 (1953).
284. N.M. Stat. Ann. §58-6-13 (1953). The statute forbids not merely issuance of
the writ, but the commencement of an action by attachment.

